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1 Introduction 
This dissertation consists of the three papers “Stakeholder rights and 
economic performance: The profitability of nonprofits”, “Stakeholder 
conflicts and dividend policy: A cleaner test”, and “Ownership and the 
decision to go public”. 
A fundamental question in economics is how economic activity 
should be organized. Seminal work by (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) suggests 
that the firm may be considered as a nexus of contracts between the firm's 
stakeholders. Suppliers of goods and capital contract with customers and 
workers, and the firm can be thought of as this bundle of contracts. 
Ownership rights (i.e., control rights and cash flow rights) can, in principle, 
be assigned to any of these stakeholders, or shared between them. 1
In the modern capitalist society, the stockholder owned firm is very 
prevalent. According to (Hansmann, 1996), the stockholder owned firm can 
be viewed as a cooperative ownership structure, where ownership rights are 
assigned to the suppliers of capital. Fundamentally, this organizational form 
is not different from a cooperativ owned by for example suppliers of other 
input factors, or by customers. Indeed, large parts of the economy are run by 
firms owned by other stakeholder groups than capital providers. In fact, 
some firms are organized as nonprofits which means they have no owners 
whatsoever. 
 
Each ownership structure comes with its own costs. These costs 
include contracting costs between owners and non-owners, coordination 
costs between owners, and costs related to delegated management. A rich 
literature has evolved describing how these costs can be minimized. (Fama, 
1980) argues that in large organizations, the main mechanism for discipline 
and control of management is the competitive environment in which the firm 
operates. 
This dissertation looks at this fundamental governance issue from 
three angles. First, we shed some light on the question of what is the optimal 
organizational form. We document that firms with very different governance 
structures successfully compete in a single industry (paper 1). Then we go on 
to investigate how the stakeholders that do control the firm treat non-
controlling stakeholders. We find that controlling stakeholders use their 
power carefully not to alienate non-controlling stakeholders (paper 2). 
Finally, we investigate what makes the firm's controlling owners willing to 
relinquish some of their ownership rights. Our findings suggest that owners 
with large holdings are more reluctant to take their firm to the public market 
(paper 3). 
                                                     
1 Like (Hansmann, 1996), we use the term owner for someone who has both formal 
control rights and residual cash flow rights in the firm. 
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The public, stockholder owned firm with delegated control has been 
thoroughly analyzed in the literature. In this dissertation we depart from the 
standard setup and look at privately held and nonprofit firms. We find that 
they can successfully compete with stockholder owned firm. Private and 
nonprofit firms enjoy benefits from not being under the scrutiny of the 
public capital market, while they are disciplined by substitute governance 
mechanisms, like product market competition and leverage. 
1.1 Stakeholder rights and economic performance: The 
profitability of nonprofits 
A common view in the UK and the US is that firms should maximize profits, 
and that residual claimants should hold all the ownership rights. In contrast, 
conventional wisdom in Continental Europe, Japan, and Scandinavia is that 
firms should have multiple goals and allocate ownership rights to more 
stakeholder types than just the residual claimants. 
The standard corporate governance model suggests that firms with 
shareholder wealth maximization as their only goal will be more profitable 
than firms with multiple goals. The existing literature has barely addressed 
this question empirically. Rather, it has analyzed extensively whether cross-
sectional differences in ownership structure correlate with differences in 
performance. Moreover, these studies only compare firms that all have 
owners, i.e., stakeholders who possess both components of the ownership 
right. Therefore, the current empirical literature leaves unanswered the more 
fundamental question of whether firms need owners for governance reasons 
in the first place. That question cannot be answered unless firms with owners 
are compared to firms that do not have owners. 
We address this issue empirically by exploring whether the 
allocation of ownership rights among the firm’s stakeholders matter for its 
economic performance. In our sample we include two types of firms: Firms 
where the ownership rights are held by the suppliers of capital (the 
stockholder owned firm) and firms which have no owners, and where the 
control rights (but no cash flow rights) are distributed to a wide range of 
stakeholders (the nonprofit firm). Both types of firms compete in the same 
industry and are facing the same regulatory regime. Hence we are able to 
compare the relative performance of firms with two very different corporate 
governance structures. 
Surprisingly, we find that nonprofit firms are no less profitable than 
shareholder owned firms. This supports the idea that managers of firms with 
potential agency problems can be disciplined by other governance 
mechanisms than monitoring by owners. We find evidence suggesting that 
product market competition plays such a substitute role. We conclude that 
once one account for the disciplining effect of competition on firm behavior, 
organizational form is no longer a primary determinant of performance. 
13 
 
1.2 Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy: A cleaner test 
Two types of potential conflicts of interest (agency problems) between the 
firm's stakeholders are common. The first agency problem is between the 
firm’s owners and management. Stockholders may worry that management 
follows their own agenda, which might not be to the benefit of the firm's 
stockholders. In other words, management may extract control benefits at the 
expense of the owners. The second agency problem might arise between 
large controlling owners and small minority owners. The large owners may 
choose to use their power to divert firm assets to their own best use at the 
expense of the minority. This may for example happen in related party 
transactions (tunneling). 
Both types of potential conflict of interests bare costs for the firm. 
For instance, under the second agency problem, minority shareholders may 
be reluctant to provide the firm with new equity financing. This will increase 
the cost of capital and decrease the firm’s investments in labor and 
productive assets. 
Dividend policy can be used to influence these two types of agency 
costs. Firms with dispersed shareholdings are likely to have a more intense 
conflicts between management and owners (the first agency problem). If 
dividend policy is being used to alleviate this cost, we would expect higher 
dividends from firms with more dispersed shareholding. On the other hand, 
if ownership becomes more concentrated, the second agency problem will 
become more costly. If a majority owner wants to use dividend policy to 
alleviate this cost, firms with concentrated ownership will pay higher 
dividends. 
There is an existing literature investigating how dividend policy is 
used to influence these two agency costs. However, most empirical papers 
relate stakeholder conflicts to dividend policy by regressing the firm’s 
payout ratio on its ownership concentration. Unfortunately, this approach 
ignores that fact that the two existing dividend theories (the substitution 
model and the outcome model) makes opposite predictions for how 
ownership concentration relates to dividend payments under the two agency 
problems. By allowing ownership concentration to vary widely across the 
sample firms, the relative importance of the two agency problems also 
varies. Therefore, it is difficult to tell which dividend theory is consistent 
with the data. 
We study an environment where the conflicts between large and 
small owners is small because a binding legal constraint makes ownership 
concentration low in every firm. In contrast, the potential seriousness of the 
conflicts between owners and non-owners varies more than usual, due to 
differences in organizational form. In one firm type, majority control is 
allocated to the owners, while in the other it is allocated to non-owner 
stakeholders (employees, customers, and community citizens). Thus, 
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ownership concentration is unusually low in both firm types, and owners are 
strong relative to other stakeholders in one firm type and weak in the other. 
Overall we find that the larger the potential agency problem, the more of the 
firm’s earnings is paid out as dividends. This supports the notion that 
dividend policy is used to mitigate agency costs. 
1.3 Ownership and the decision to go public 
The going public decision involves a choice by current owners to give up 
some or all of the control beneﬁts they consumed while the company was 
private. There is a rich theoretical literature explaining the decision to go 
public. However, the question is so far not well explored empirically. The 
main challenge in an empirical study is lack of detailed data on private ﬁrms. 
It is obviously problematic that one does not observe historical accounting 
information, ownership structure, and other characteristics for IPO ﬁrms 
prior to the listing date. However, it is equally limiting not to observe the 
ﬁrms that decide to stay private. The main contribution of this paper is to 
analyze the determinants of the IPO decision using data where this 
information is available for a very large sample of private ﬁrms over an 
extensive time period. 
In related studies, ﬁrms are observed for a particular reason which is 
not directly related to the IPO. For example, it may study ﬁrms that have a 
relationship with particular banks, ﬁrms with publicly traded debt, firms in 
the manufacturing industry, or firms that are public, but decide to go private. 
The existing studies suffer from not observing all firms that might go public, 
but choose not to. Also, it is generally difficult to observe ownership 
structure for firms that stay private. These studies find support for the idea 
that firms do an IPO to access the public capital markets, to acquire other 
firms, and to adjust their capital structure after a period of high investments. 
Our data allow us to perform a detailed study of ﬁrms that decide to 
go public as well as of firms that decide to stay private, independently of the 
firm’s specific setting. We use accounting information and ownership 
structure data for all limited liability firms incorporated in Norway. 
We corroborate earlier findings that firms go public to access the 
capital markets. Moreover, we find new evidence supporting the idea that 
large owners keep their firms private to enjoy control benefits. Our results 
suggest that their opportunity to consume control benefits decrease when the 
firm is highly levered. This suggest high leverage is a control mechanism. 
Also, we find that having institutional owners make the firms more likely go 
public. 
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2 Stakeholder rights and economic performance: 
The profitability of nonprofits1
 
 
With Øyvind Bøhren 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores whether ownership matters in a fundamental sense by 
comparing the performance of stockholder-owned firms to the much less 
analyzed nonprofit firms. No stakeholder has residual cash flow rights in 
nonprofit firms, and the control rights are held by customers, employees, and 
the community. Accounting for differences in size and risk and only 
comparing firms within the same industry, we find that stockholder-owned 
firms do not outperform nonprofits. This result is consistent with the notion 
that the governance function of residual claimants may be successfully 
replaced by other mechanisms. We find evidence that product market 
competition plays this role as a substitute disciplining device. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, stakeholders, ownership, nonprofits, 
competition, banks 
 
JEL classification codes: G21, G34 
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2.1 Introduction 
The objective of the firm and the allocation of ownership rights (i.e., control 
rights and residual cash flow rights) among its stakeholders are two related 
issues that attract considerable public attention. A common view in the UK 
and the US is that firms should maximize profits, and that residual claimants 
should hold all the ownership rights (Macey & O'Hara, 2003). In contrast, 
conventional wisdom in Continental Europe, Japan, and Scandinavia is that 
firms should have multiple goals and allocate ownership rights to more 
stakeholder types than just the residual claimants (Allen, Carletti, & 
Marquez, 2009).  
Our paper addresses this issue empirically by exploring whether the 
allocation of ownership rights among the firm’s stakeholders matters for its 
economic performance. We focus on socalled nonprofit firms, in which no 
stakeholder has both control rights and residual cash flow rights (Hansmann, 
1996). In addition, the nonprofit firms in our sample have multiple 
objectives. This setting allows us to test the agency-inspired prediction that 
returns to capital invested in nonprofit firms with multiple objectives will be 
lower than in firms that are controlled by residual claimants and have 
maximum profits as the only goal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). We find that 
this hypothesis is not carried out in the data, and we analyze the economic 
mechanisms which may be driving this result. 
The existing literature has barely addressed this question 
empirically. Rather, it has analyzed extensively whether cross-sectional 
differences in ownership structure correlate with differences in performance 
(see (Becht, Bolton, & Röell, 2003) for a survey). Moreover, these studies 
only compare firms that all have owners, i.e., stakeholders who possess both 
components of the ownership right (Hansmann, 1996). Therefore, the current 
empirical literature leaves unanswered the more fundamental question of 
whether firms need owners for governance reasons in the first place. That 
question cannot be answered unless firms with owners are compared to firms 
that do not have owners. By definition, nonprofits have no owners, as no 
stakeholder in such a firm can have both control rights and cash flow rights. 
Although called nonprofits, these firms can still make profits. However, the 
profits cannot be distributed to stakeholders with control rights. 
Consequently, our empirical setting allows us to compare the performance of 
profit-maximizing firms with owners to the performance of multiple-
objectives firms without owners.2
                                                     
2 Empirical tests of stakeholders and corporate governance have not focused on the 
firm’s performance, but its behavior, such as productive efficiency (Mester, 1991), 
pricing strategy (Ashton & Letza, 2003; Cummins, Rubio-Misas, & Zi, 2004), risk 
taking (Esty, 1997a; 1997b), cost minimization (Mester, 1989), transition between 
organizational forms (Ostergaard, Schindele, & Vale, 2009), and governance 
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Understanding the governance of nonprofits is also useful per se, as 
these firms play a significant role in the economy. For instance, estimates 
from the US in the 1990s show that nonprofits account for 64% of hospital 
care, 56% of day care for children, 20% of college and university education, 
and 10% of primary and secondary training (Hansmann, 1996, p.227). 
We do not analyze why the different organizational forms in our 
sample actually exist. For instance, contracting theory shows that firms may 
not be most efficiently owned by their capital providers, but rather by other 
stakeholders, such as suppliers, customers, and employees. Such an 
allocation of ownership rights is more efficient the stronger the firm’s 
market power over these stakeholders, the more firm-specific their human 
capital, and the less symmetric the information between the contracting 
parties (Hansmann, 1996). To ensure a sufficient focus of the paper, we take 
the variation in observed organizational forms as exogenously given. To 
ensure a homogenous contracting environment across the sample firms, they 
are all taken from the same industry. 
We use firm-level data from the population of Norwegian banks, 
which differ widely in how cash flow rights and control rights are distributed 
among the stakeholders. One firm type is the standard stock company. These 
are commercial banks, where profit maximization is the goal, stockholders 
have all the cash flow rights, and stockholders control the board. In contrast, 
no stakeholder has cash flow rights in an ownerless (nonprofit) bank. That is, 
nobody can claim the firm’s assets and the free cash flow once the creditors 
have been paid off. The ownerless firms in our sample also have multiple 
objectives, and the control (voting) rights are shared by the employees, 
customers, and community citizens. There is also a third firm type in the 
sample which is a mixture of the two pure types. The three firm types have 
equal access to the same, unsegmented product market and operate under the 
same regulatory regime. 
The power of our tests is increased by this combination of high 
heterogeneity in stakeholder structure and low heterogeneity in contracting 
environment, market opportunities, and regulation. If a key to economic 
success involves profit maximization as the goal and control by residual 
claimants as a governance mechanism, this should at least show up as 
performance differences between firms that operate in the same 
                                                                                                                            
activity (Crespi, Garcia-Cestona, & Salas, 2004). Moreover, the stakeholder 
structures are quite homogenous across sample firms in these studies. With very few 
exceptions (Crespi, Garcia-Cestona, & Salas, 2004; Ostergaard, Schindele, & Vale, 
2009), the analyzed firms have at least one stakeholder with both cash flow rights 
and voting rights, such as equity investors in regular stock companies, depositors in 
S&Ls, policy-holders in insurance mutuals, and producers in cooperatives. Thus, all 
these firm types have owners. 
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environment, but represent the largest possible difference in objectives and 
control structure.  
Specifically, the agency logic suggests that compared to profit-
maximizing firms controlled by stockholders, ownerless firms with multiple 
objectives have a double handicap regarding their ability to produce high 
returns to capital invested. Therefore, commercial banks should produce 
higher returns than other banks because their owners monitor the 
management team and because concern for non-owner stakeholders may be 
costly for the owners. The performance of the hybrid banks should be 
somewhere in between the two pure types. 
Our major finding is that owned banks do not outperform ownerless 
banks.  This result does not imply that stockholders produce no value beyond 
providing capital. However, it does suggest that other mechanisms can 
successfully replace the governance function of residual claimants. That is, 
managers of ownerless firms may be efficiently disciplined by substitutes for 
ownership.  
The three owner substitutes we consider are regulation, capital 
constraints, and product market competition. First, it may be argued that the 
public banking supervisor has a monitoring function because it supervises all 
firms in our sample. However, supervisors do not mimic the governance role 
of stockholders, as the supervisors’ job is to limit the downside risk and 
ensure firm survival rather than encourage the highest possible return to 
capital invested. Second, one may argue that because ownerless banks 
cannot raise equity, the lacking access to such funding makes ownerless 
banks less prone to agency-induced overinvestment. We find no empirical 
support for this explanation.  
The third potential substitute for owner monitoring is the need to 
perform under competitive pressure. It has been argued repeatedly that only 
efficient firms survive when competition is strong (Machlup, 1967; Schmidt, 
1997). (Giroud & Mueller, 2010; 2011) have recently given empirical 
support to this idea in a corporate governance setting. For instance, they 
show in their sample of stockholder-owned firms that monitoring by owners 
and product market competition are substitute governance mechanisms. In 
fact, governance quality matters for operating efficiency only in non-
competitive markets. In our setting, which is more general by also involving 
nonprofits, the corresponding argument would be that competition 
disciplines a firm regardless of its stakeholder structure. Therefore, 
ownerless firms will only persist in competitive markets if they perform as 
well as owned firms. By disciplining all firms, competition mitigates the 
governance handicap of ownerless firms. We find support for this 
interpretation of our major finding, using firm-level data on the relationship 
between firm performance and competitive pressure. 
We conclude that the observed relationship between stakeholder 
structure and economic performance is inconsistent with the agency logic. 
19 
 
This suggests there is a serious challenger to the classic organizational form 
of enterprise that assigns full control rights and cash flow rights to the capital 
providers of profit-maximizing firms. Neither the one-dimensional objective 
of profit-maximization nor the stockholders’ monitoring function of 
management may be critical for creating high returns to capital invested. In 
either case, competitive markets may be the underlying mechanism that does 
the job in the absence of residual claimants. 
Section 2 in the following describes the governance structure of the 
three firm types, and section 3 presents the data set and key industry 
characteristics. We analyze the economic performance in section 4, while 
section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2.2 Firm types and governance structures 
The ownerless firms in our sample are pure savings banks (sparebank), 
which are controlled by depositors, employees, and the local government.  
These firms should not be confused with mutuals, which are not ownerless, 
but owned by their customers, suppliers or employees. Thus, ownerless 
banks are fundamentally different from S&Ls in the US, which are consumer 
cooperatives mutually owned by their depositors. However, our ownerless 
savings banks resemble the so-called mutual savings bank in the US. Despite 
their name, these banks are in fact ownerless firms, as no stakeholder has 
residual cash flow rights. 
Commercial banks (forretningsbank) are listed companies fully 
owned by stockholders. The third type, which we call a PCC bank 
(grunnfondsbank), has voluntarily transformed itself from an pure savings 
bank into a hybrid form by issuing Primary Capital Certificates (hence 
PCC). These are regular equity securities with voting rights and residual 
cash flow rights, providing returns in terms of dividends and capital gains. 
Like the equity security in commercial banks, PCC securities are held by the 
general public and are most often publicly listed. Thus, a PCC bank is partly 
ownerless, partly owned. 
Given these differences in stakeholder structure, it is no surprise that 
the objective function varies across the three organizational forms. 
Commercial banks have profit maximization as their goal, whereas 
ownerless savings banks (hereafter non-PCC banks) have multiple goals. 
Other goals beyond making profits include promoting saving in society and 
offering bank services to a wide range of citizens. The hybrid PCC banks 
also have multiple goals, but the objective function also reflects that 
stockholders own part of the equity. Non-PCCs distribute on average 4% of 
their earnings for social purposes over the sample period. PCCs distribute 
1%, whereas the figure for commercial banks is not available. 
Table 1 shows how control (voting) rights and cash flow rights are 
distributed among the four stakeholders in the three firm types. The 
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ownerless non-PCC bank has a committee of representatives with members 
appointed by the employees (25% of the votes), depositors (37.5%), and 
community citizens (37.5%). This committee elects the board, and the two 
bodies jointly hire and fire the CEO. No stakeholder has residual cash flow 
rights. 
Commercial banks have stockholders who write the corporate 
charter and hold 73% of the votes for appointing directors. 3
The first Norwegian ownerless savings bank was established in 
1822, followed by the first stockholder-owned commercial bank in 1848. 
New regulation in 1985 allowed for the first conversion by an ownerless 
savings bank (non-PCC) to a PCC bank in 1988. Germany (Krahnen & 
Schmidt, 2004), Norway, and Spain (Crespi, Garcia-Cestona, & Salas, 2004) 
are the three European countries in which savings banks have a prevalent 
position in the economy, accounting for roughly half the banking assets. 
Only Norway and Spain have ownerless banks, as German savings banks are 
owned by local governments. Unlike in Norway, the founders of Spanish 
ownerless banks are on the board.
  Stockholders 
have a 100%  claim on the residual cash flow. The holders of PCC securities 
are owners with a fractional claim on the residual cash flow. This fraction 
corresponds to their share of the book equity, which varies between 5% and 
92% across the sample. The remaining fraction is the ownerless equity. The 
owners’ voting right is 25% by law. All three bank types have a two-tiered 
board structure. Except for charter amendments, which require a two thirds 
majority, all decisions in both tiers are made by simple majority. 
4
Norwegian banks went through a systemic crisis in 1988-1992 (Moe, 
Solheim, & Vale, 2004). The first bank failure occurred in the fall of 1988, 
13 small and medium sized banks failed in 1988–1990, and large 
commercial banks started failing towards the end of 1990. As government 
support of distressed banks sometimes required the write-off of existing 
equity, the three largest commercial banks came under full state ownership 
in 1992. The industry regained profitability in 1993, and the state gradually 
reduced its ownership thereafter. By the end of our sample period, the state 
 PCC banks only exist in Norway, but 
recent regulation has opened up for PCCs in Spain as well. 
                                                     
3 Limited liability firms with more than 200 employees are required by law to have 
one third of their directors elected by and among the employees. Special regulation 
reduces this fraction to 27% in commercial banks. All commercial banks in our 
sample have more than 200 employees. 
4  No existing study of Spanish banks relates the stakeholder structure to value 
creation. Some do not distinguish between owned banks and ownerless banks 
(Fuentelsaz, Gomez, & Polo, 2002; Maudos, 1998; Prior, 2003). Those who do 
focus on differences in governance activity (Crespi, Garcia-Cestona, & Salas, 2004), 
cost efficiency (Grifell-Tatje & Lovell, 1997; Maudos & Pastor, 2003; Tortosa-
Ausina, 2002a; 2002b), and credit risk (Salas & Saurina, 2002). 
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held a 47.8% stake in the largest commercial bank and had sold all their 
shares in the two others. 
2.3 Industry characteristics 
All banks in our sample have access to the same, unsegmented product 
markets throughout the sample period. There are no major regulatory 
barriers preventing the banks from entering each others’ product markets or 
geographical regions. The three bank types are subject to the same capital 
coverage constraints and reporting requirements. They are monitored by the 
same public banking inspector according to the same set of monitoring 
principles. Thus, neither their business nor their regulatory environment 
suggests that the potential for consuming private benefits differs 
systematically across the three bank types. 
Our data set includes every Norwegian savings bank (non-PCC and 
PCC) and all listed Norwegian commercial banks from 1985 to 2002. There 
are 2668 firm years, of which non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and commercial 
banks account for 2288, 214, and 166, respectively. As shown by panel (a) 
of table 2, the number of non-PCC banks and commercial banks drops over 
time from 191 to 103 and from 15 to 2, respectively. The number of PCC 
banks grows from 3 to 24. The drop in the number of non-PCC banks is 
mainly a result of conversion to PCC banks and national industry 
consolidation, while the drop in the number of commercial banks is a result 
of national and Nordic industry consolidation. 
Panel (b) of table 2 shows total bank assets across bank types. 
Savings banks as a group (i.e., PCCs and non-PCCs) gain market share over 
the sample period, but non-PCCs gradually lose market share to PCCs, 
primarily because large non-PCCs convert to PCCs. Whereas aggregate PCC 
assets are just half of non-PCC assets in 1988, they are almost three times 
bigger in 2002. Descriptive statistics for size per bank is reported in panel 
(c). Every distribution reflects that each type includes a few unusually large 
banks. The median commercial bank is about five times larger than a PCC 
bank, which is twelve times the size of a non-PCC. This suggests that 
controlling for differences in firm size is potentially important in empirical 
tests. 
Table 3 shows that interest rates on deposits do not differ 
systematically between bank types. However, the average lending rate on 
home mortgages, which is the largest asset in every bank type, is lower in 
commercial banks every year except the first. Thus, the average interest 
margin is higher in stakeholder-oriented firms, reflecting a less aggressive 
pricing policy. 
Since non-PCC banks are not listed, we cannot use market returns to 
estimate risk measures like stock beta or the volatility of stock returns. 
Instead, we use accounting figures for all three bank types. Following (Esty, 
22 
 
1997a; 1997b), our basic risk measures are estimated from the balance sheet, 
using the composition of the assets and liabilities to proxy for asset risk and 
liability risk, respectively. As a robustness check, we measure risk by the 
volatility of asset returns in section 4.2. 
Panel (a) of table 4 describes the asset structure across bank types. 
We divide the assets into seven categories and construct averages by value-
weighting across firms per year and equally-weighting across years. The risk 
of the assets is generally increasing from left to right in the table. The figures 
show that ownerless banks hold less risky assets than other banks. 
Amortizable loans, which is the largest asset component in every bank type, 
is much higher in savings banks than commercial banks (75% vs. 49%). 
Short-term assets, which are the second largest asset component for every 
bank type, are slightly more common in commercial banks (21% vs. 17%). 
We classify the liabilities into four categories. Liability risk is higher 
the more the bank is financed with debt, and the more risky the components 
of the debt.5 This means that in panel (b) of table 4, liability risk increases 
from left to right. The table shows that ownerless banks have more equity 
than other banks. 6  Also, the composition of the debt reflects a lower 
tendency by ownerless banks to take on risk. They rely much more on 
deposits (75% vs. 47%), use less subordinated debt, borrow less in the 
interbank market, and finance less from other debt sources. Thus, non-PCC 
banks fund their assets more by deposits and less by market borrowing than 
commercial banks. PCC banks are roughly midway between the two.7
This observed relationship between stakeholder structure and bank 
behavior is generally consistent with the existing theory and empirics. For 
  
                                                     
5 Because deposits are insured by a fund collectively financed by the banks, and 
because the government is a lender of last resort, there is no deposit risk for 
customers. As Due to banks and Other liabilities represent market funding, these 
liabilities are sensitive to interest rate movements and may also be more costly to 
roll over under adverse market conditions. Thus, banks relying more on market 
funding are generally more risky. 
6 Equity was about 7% for non-PCCs and 3% for the other two types when the 
banking crisis ended. All bank types and particularly non-PCCs become 
permanently less leveraged afterwards. Regulation says total liable capital must be at 
least 8% of total risk-weighted assets. This ratio may differ considerably from the 
corresponding ratio based on unweighted assets. 
7 To check these relationships more formally, we estimate a multinomial logit model 
that predicts bank type from the bank’s size, growth, and balance sheet structure in 
any given year. The model is estimated separately for the whole period (1985-2002), 
the crisis years (1988-1992), and the post-crisis period (1993-2002). The results, 
which are available upon request, support the impression from table 4. For instance, 
over the period as a whole and also during the crisis, the probability that a randomly 
selected bank is a commercial bank rather than a non-PCC is significantly higher the 
larger the bank and the more risky its liabilities. 
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instance, (Allen, Carletti, & Marquez, 2009) show theoretically that if a firm 
starts internalizing their employees’ private layoff costs under financial 
distress, it will take less risk, reduce size, and price its products less 
aggressively. (Esty, 1997b) finds empirically that when depositor-owned 
S&Ls in the US convert to stockholder-owned commercial banks, they take 
on more risk.8
In summary, the ownerless non-PCC banks are generally smaller and 
carry less risk on both sides of the balance sheet than banks that stockholders 
own fully (commercial banks) or partially (PCC banks).
 
9
                                                     
8 The banking literature generally shows that customers and owners may disagree on 
what constitutes the bank’s optimal size and risk-taking. First, banking relationships 
are valuable for the customers and particularly for start-up firms with limited access 
to alternative debt financing. This has been shown both theoretically (Bhattacharya 
& Chiesa, 1995; Boot & Thakor, 1994; Campbell, 1979; Diamond, 1991; Fama, 
1985; Rajan, 1992; Von Thadden, 1995; Yosha, 1995) and empirically (Hubbard, 
Kuttner, & Palia, 1999; Ongena, Smith, & Michalsen, 2003; Slovin, Sushka, & 
Polonchek, 1993). Second, (Karceski, Ongena, & Smith, 2005) document that 
customers may be adversely affected when a bank is insolvent or merge. Third, 
(Berger & Udell, 1995; Peek & Rosengren, 1996) show that as banks grow, they 
reduce the supply of loans to small businesses. Fourth, (Stein, 2002) provides a 
theoretical explanation for a size effect in lending, where large banks lend to large 
firms and small banks lend to small firms in equilibrium. Finally, the risk effect also 
follows from the options pricing model (Black & Scholes, 1973). This implies that 
because equity is a call option on the underlying assets, higher asset volatility 
increases the value of equity at the expense of other claimholders. Therefore, unlike 
non-PCC banks, a commercial bank may act in its owners’ best interest by 
increasing cash flow volatility without rewriting the contract with its non-owner 
stakeholders. 
 The three bank 
types are subject to the same regulatory constraints, operate in the same 
unsegmented product markets, and are not protected by major barriers to 
entry. 
9 Differences in stakeholder structure may not be the only reason why balance sheets 
differ. First, because commercial banks are much larger than savings banks, they 
may be tempted to take excessive risk. However, this moral hazard problem of 
feeling too big to fail is not due to the stakeholder structure, but to the regulator’s 
concern for credit contagion. Second, non-PCCs may have low risk because they 
cannot raise new equity. Unlike the two other types, they may have to keep higher 
equity buffers and hence lower liability risk to protect themselves from adverse 
effects of market downturns. Finally, non-PCCs that want to grow and take more 
risk may decide to become PCCs. These two last explanations may bias our results 
towards finding larger size and risk differences between bank types than what is 
justified by their stakeholder structures. We cannot address the potential moral 
hazard problem, but section 4.3 shows that lacking access to new equity is not a 
binding constraint in non-PCCs. Neither do we find that endogeneity in terms of 
self-selection explains why non-PCC and PCC banks differ. 
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2.4 Stakeholders and performance 
There are no observable market values for non-PCC banks. Hence, we 
choose book return on assets (ROA) as the basic performance measure. ROA 
is operationalized as net income divided by the book value of assets. We use 
net income in the numerator of ROA because net income is after funding 
costs, i.e., interest paid on liabilities. Funding costs are typically 75% of a 
bank’s total costs in our sample. Thus, gross ROA (i.e., ROA based on 
income before funding costs) would ignore the major driver of a bank’s 
competitive cost advantage, which is its funding ability. Also, income before 
funding costs is completely dominated by the bank’s interest income. This 
implies that gross ROA moves in tandem with the general level of interest 
rates, independently of the bank’s ability to create returns on capital 
invested. 
Both distortions are absent in our (net) ROA measure. Not 
surprisingly, this is also a common performance measure in the banking 
literature (e.g., Berger, DeYoung, Genay, & Udell, 2000; Crespi, Garcia-
Cestona, & Salas, 2004; Esty, 1997a; 1997b). We will still analyze 
alternative performance measures in section 4.2, including gross ROA and 
return on equity.10
Panel (a) of table 5 shows the average ROA across bank types and 
years. Ownerless banks have the highest performance  over the period as a 
whole, being 0.88% in non-PCC banks, 0.41% in PCCs, and 0.32% in 
commercial banks, respectively. Non-PCCs have higher average ROA than 
commercial banks in 15 of the 18 sample years, and PCC banks are 
considerably closer to commercial banks than to non-PCCs.
 Notice that because our ROA is net income divided by 
total assets, it will produce lower return figures than gross ROA. For the 
same reason, it cannot be meaningfully compared to standard benchmarks 
like the riskless rate or the market risk premium. 
11
                                                     
10  Although return on equity is a more direct performance measure from the 
stockholders’ perspective, it is unsuitable in our context because its denominator is 
periodically very low and even negative in the crisis years. This produces very 
volatile and sometimes meaningless figures. For instance, average return on equity 
in commercial banks is –152% in 1991 and 18% in 1997, and one commercial bank 
had equity of –11.5 bill. NOK in 1989. 
 However, 
panel (b) shows that the statistical significance of these performance 
differences is much weaker after the banking crisis (which occurred in 1988-
1992) than before and during the crisis. Thus, the average performance does 
not differ systematically across the three groups outside the crisis period, and 
commercial banks were most negatively hit by the crisis. The latter 
observation is not surprising, given our earlier finding that commercial banks 
11 A study of governance activity in Spanish banks over a similar period finds higher 
average ROA in ownerless savings banks (1.28%) than in stockholder-owned 
commercial banks (1.13%) (Crespi, Garcia-Cestona & Salas, 2004, table 2). 
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pursue more risky investment and financing strategies. This makes their 
ROA move more strongly with overall market movements. 
Thus, as expected, ownerless banks do better relative to other banks 
the weaker the market conditions. The surprising feature in table 5 is that at 
least according to the raw ROA figures, ownerless banks are on average not 
outperformed by partially or fully owned banks in more normal times. 
2.4.1 The base case 
Since we have repeated observations for the same firm over time, we use a 
random effects model to account for unobserved firm effects in the panel. 
We use year dummies to capture unobserved industry effects on the 
performance of the banking sector as a whole (Hsiao, 2003). The robustness 
tests in section 4.2 will explore what happens when we ignore these 
unobservable firm and industry effects. We estimate the model separately for 
the full sample period (1985-2002), the banking crisis years (1988-1992), 
and for the post-crisis period (1993-2002). 
The base case model is estimated in table 6. PCC and Com are the 
two key variables in the model. Both are dummy variables that equal one if 
the bank is of the said type and zero otherwise. Thus, both are zero for a 
non-PCC bank. The agency logic predicts that the two dummy variables 
have positive coefficients, and that the commercial bank coefficient is the 
more positive of the two. 
As for control variables, we proxy for asset risk by the ratio 1- 
((cash+amortizable loans+fixed assets)/total assets) and for liability risk by 
1- (due to customers/total assets). Although we have to deal with accounting 
returns from operations rather than market returns on traded securities, we 
still expect that unless the banking industry is grossly out of equilibrium 
over extended periods, risk and return are positively related also in an 
accounting sense. Thus, we predict positive coefficients for the two risk 
proxies. Since the evidence on scale economies in banking is ambiguous 
(Berger & Humphrey, 1995; Hughes, Mester, & Moon, 2001), we do not 
predict the sign for the size coefficient. Notice, however, that the size proxy 
may account for the alternative explanation that although ownerless banks 
have a governance handicap, this is mitigated by the benefit of being small 
in an industry with diseconomies of scale. This logic predicts a negative 
coefficient for the size proxy and positive coefficients for the two bank 
dummies. 
According to the first column of results, which shows the estimates 
for the full period, the model explains 31% of the variation in ROA, and the 
model as a whole is highly significant. After having accounted for risk and 
size differences, the estimates show that a non-PCC bank is expected to 
outperform a PCC bank by 0.18 ROA units and a commercial bank by 0.77. 
The riskiness of the assets and the liabilities are both positively related to 
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returns, and there are diseconomies of scale. All these findings are 
statistically significant by wide margins. The second column of results 
estimates the basic model over the crisis years. Every sign is maintained, and 
both the economic and statistical significance increase considerably except 
for asset risk. Thus, what holds for the full sample period is even more 
pronounced in the systemic crisis. This supports the notion that the lower 
risk of non-PCC banks makes them do better than other banks in downturns. 
The right column shows that the result for the full period is driven by 
the exceptional crisis years. Although the coefficients of the bank type 
dummies keep their negative sign, they are much smaller, the commercial 
bank dummy is no longer significant, and the PCC dummy is only 
significant at 9%. Thus, there is no obvious performance difference between 
bank types after the crisis.12
The remarkable result is that owned banks do not outperform 
ownerless banks in normal times. This suggests the governance of ownerless 
firms is not inferior to that of owned firms. In the following, we first analyze 
the robustness of the base-case result. Next, we explore substitutes for the 
governance role of the missing owners in ownerless firms. 
 
2.4.2 Robustness 
We analyze the robustness of the base-case by (i) applying alternative 
methods for utilizing the panel structure, (ii) using sized-matched samples, 
(iii) proxying for risk by ROA volatility, and by (iv) measuring performance 
in alternative ways. 
Table 7 documents that the econometric technique used to handle the 
panel structure influences the estimates. Model (a) is the base-case from 
table 6, (b) ignores unobservable performance effects at the firm level by 
only considering time-varying fixed effects for the banking industry, and 
model (c) ignores both. The estimates show that if we just run OLS on the 
pooled sample in model (c), the adjusted R2 drops by almost 90% for the full 
period and by roughly two thirds in the two sub-periods. Notice also from 
models (a) and (b) that what matters for overall model fit is industry effects 
rather than firm effects. Thus, the key unobservable characteristic is the 
time-varying determinants of performance which influence all three firm 
types in the same way. 
The base-case results may be influenced by the fact most non-PCCs 
are small compared to PCCs and commercial banks. For instance, table 2 
                                                     
12 Three pairs of independent variables are relatively strongly correlated: firm size 
and financial risk (0.68), firm size and the commercial bank dummy (0.48), and 
financial risk and the commercial bank dummy (0.52). Nevertheless, table 6 shows 
that the individual coefficients for are almost always significantly different from 
zero. 
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shows that the median commercial bank is sixty times larger than the median 
non-PCC bank. Although our base-case model does control for size, the fact 
that size is so consistently different across bank types may create a sample 
heterogeneity that is not properly picked up by our size proxy. For instance, 
the technology used by small banks may deviate so much from that of large 
banks that just a proportional control for size on performance does not 
capture this difference. To handle size heterogeneity better, we construct a 
matching sample where size is much more homogeneous across bank types. 
The matched sample only contains non-PCC banks that are larger than the 
smallest commercial bank. Moreover, we keep at least as many non-PCC 
banks as commercial banks in the sample. These restrictions reduce sample 
size by roughly 80% to 473 firm years, of which 185, 127, and 161 are for 
non-PCCs, PCCs, and commercial banks, respectively. The median size of a 
commercial bank in this sample is 3.4 times the median non-PCC, compared 
to 60 in the base-case. 
Panel (a) of table 8 shows that when we re-estimate the base-case 
model in the matched sample, the main results persist, although the bank 
type dummies have weaker statistical significance due to much smaller 
samples. This also suggests that the possibly higher margins in product 
markets chosen by the smaller, ownerless banks is not driving our main 
result. 
To address this question directly, we account for differences in 
market-driven profit opportunities by adding the interest margin as a new 
independent variable in the base-case model. In unreported regressions that 
are available upon request, we find that the interest margin does have a 
positive impact on the bank’s performance. However, accounting for the 
margin does nothing substantial to any other relationship, including the role 
of bank type. Thus, the performance effect of being ownerless, which often 
involves being small, is not driven by higher margins in these firms’ product 
markets. Notice also that the base-case model in table 6 shows economies of 
scale in the post-crisis period. Still, there is no significant performance effect 
of being owned vs. ownerless once size is controlled for. 
In panel (b), we measure risk by ROA volatility rather than by the 
risk proxies from the balance sheet that we used in the base-case model. We 
estimate ROA volatility in year t as the standard deviation of the bank’s 
ROA from t-1 to t+1.13
                                                     
13 Just like we found using risk measures from the balance sheet in table 4, ROA 
volatility is highest in commercial banks and lowest in non-PCCs. ROA volatility 
for all bank types peaks around the banking crisis. 
 The table shows that the relationship between bank 
type and performance from table 6 is generally upheld. However, the 
economic and statistical significance drops, and non-PCCs differ less from 
PCCs. Also, the relationship between risk and return becomes negative and 
is stronger in the full period than in the two sub-periods. We suspect this 
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result is due to two fundamental data problems in our estimates of ROA 
volatility. First, we only have annual data and a maximum of 18 
observations per firm. Second, the structural relationship between ROA and 
ROA volatility is unstable over time. In particular, volatility is very high and 
performance is very low in the crisis. Thus, even if we had a longer time 
series, we may not have been able to improve the precision of the risk 
estimates by extending the estimation window beyond the three years used in 
table 8. For these reasons, we put more trust in the risk measures from the 
balance sheet as used in the base-case model. 
The fourth robustness test replaces ROA by alternatively the gross 
ROA (i.e., returns to assets before funding costs), ROE (return on equity), 
profit margin (net income over revenues), and the interest margin (net 
interest income over assets). Table 9 shows the findings, which are more 
consistent with those under ROA from table 6 if we measure performance by 
gross ROA, ROE, or the profit margin than by the interest rate margin. For 
instance, ROA, gross ROA, ROE, and the profit margin all produce a 
negative, significant coefficient for the PCC and Commercial dummies in 
the full period and the crisis period. Also, they produce a positive, significant 
sign for asset risk in ten of twelve cases. The only difference is that unlike 
the ROA, the ROE, and the profit margin, the gross ROA indicates that 
commercial banks do significantly better than the two other types after the 
crisis. As discussed earlier, however, (net) ROA is a more suitable 
performance measure for banks. Unlike gross ROA, it reflects the ability to 
manage the most important cost component (funding costs), and it does not 
move in tandem with market interest rates. It is reassuring that our major 
finding is quite insensitive to how performance is measured. 
So far, we have ignored any endogeneity caused by the possibility 
that poorly performing non-PCCs may have converted to PCCs in order to 
raise new equity. In fact, (Ostergaard, Schindele, & Vale, 2009) find that low 
equity is the strongest predictor of conversion from non-PCC to PCC. 
Ignoring this possibility may bias our results towards overestimating the 
relative performance of non-PCCs. Hence, we have re-estimated the base-
case model by first pooling non-PCCs and PCCs into one group. 
Subsequently, we exclude all PCCs and also the non-PCCs that later convert 
to the PCC form. These two robustness tests, which are available upon 
request, produce no material changes to the base-case results in table 6. 
2.4.3 Two alternative explanations 
The major finding so far is that after controlling for differences in size and 
risk, performance is not higher in owned firms than in ownerless firms. This 
is a puzzling result in an agency perspective. Certainly, the controlling 
stakeholders in ownerless firms have incentives to make the firm survive in 
order to provide them with future control benefits, such as below-market 
29 
 
product prices paid by customers, inflated wages paid to employees, and 
sponsoring of community projects.  However, and as a direct consequence of 
such private benefits of control, the stakeholders of ownerless firms lack the 
incentive to maximize returns to capital invested. 
We will analyze two reasons why our finding may still be plausible 
from an economic point of view. First, suppose the stockholders are forced 
to be passive for exogenous reasons, such as regulation. If that happens, the 
key governance mechanism in agency theory will not be allowed to operate 
in the owned firms. Hence, owned firms would have the same governance 
handicap as ownerless firms according to the agency logic, and we would 
expect no performance differences. 
Second, any firm with any stakeholder structure may be disciplined 
by other and even more powerful governance mechanisms than the owners’ 
monitoring of management. One example is product market competition. In 
such a case, residual claimants may not be critical for making the firm 
perform well. We will analyze the governance role of several potential 
owner substitutes in our sample. 
2.4.4 Restrictions on ownership  
Are the owners of commercial banks and PCC banks able to execute their 
control rights in a value-creating way? If not, they would be like ownerless 
banks in the sense that there is no monitoring of management by residual 
claimants. Governance research has found that the firm’s performance tends 
to improve when ownership rights are held directly by persons rather than 
indirectly through intermediaries and when some owners have sufficiently 
strong incentives and power to monitor (Becht, Bolton, & Röell, 2003). 
Applying this logic to our sample, table 10 reports the aggregate equity 
fraction per owner type in panel (a) and the fraction held by the largest 
owner and the five largest owners in panel (b). Panel (a) shows that the 
average direct (personal) ownership is about 50% in a PCC bank and 20% in 
a commercial bank. The corresponding figure in other Norwegian firms is 
18% over a similar period (Bøhren & Ødegaard, 2006). This high incidence 
of direct ownership in our sample suggests that being ownerless is more of a 
governance handicap in banking than in other industries. This feature 
increases the power of our test. 
The opposite impression follows from panel (b), which shows that 
ownership concentration in banks is considerably below the typical level in 
Norwegian industry, which is about 30% for the largest owner and 55% for 
the five largest (Bøhren & Ødegaard, 2006). The low concentration in 
banking is due to regulation, which mandates permission from the Ministry 
of Finance to own more than 10% for any stockholder or alliance of 
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stockholders.14
Nevertheless, a 10% ownership stake represents no trivial amount in 
terms of inherent monitoring incentives. For instance, 10% of the equity in 
the largest and smallest commercial bank in 2002 is NOK 2.5 billion and 0.2 
billion, respectively. Thus, although regulation forces ownership 
concentration below its optimum level, it does not destroy the potential for 
active monitoring by the owners of PCCs and commercial banks. 
 This cap is binding for the median commercial bank in our 
sample, and it reduces the power of our test. 
2.4.5 Substitutes for the governance role of ownership 
Pressure from owners is not critical for performance if other governance 
mechanisms can do the job at comparable costs. We consider three such 
substitutes for the monitoring function of owners: (i) regulators in all firms, 
(ii) capital constraints in ownerless firms and (iii) competition in all firms. 
The public banking supervisor monitors according to the same, 
detailed rules in every bank. Thus, it may be argued that high-quality 
banking supervision plays the governance role of owners. If it does, the 
regulator may make owners redundant in owned firms and heal the 
governance handicap of ownerless firms. However, the banking supervisor’s 
job is not to maximize the risk-adjusted return to bank assets. Rather, it is to 
limit downside risk.15
The second potential owner substitute is based on the fact that by 
construction, non-PCC banks cannot raise new equity. Thus, whereas owned 
banks can equity-finance overinvestment with both earnings and proceeds 
from stock issues, ownerless banks can only use earnings. This financial 
constraint may discipline managers of ownerless banks in similar ways that 
active owners can discipline managers of owned banks. If this happens, it 
would force overinvesting ownerless banks to finance growth more heavily 
with debt than other banks. Therefore, the agency logic predicts that 
ownerless banks have higher leverage and are closer to the regulatory 
 Therefore, the existence of a public supervisor may 
explain why depositors are willing to leave their money with banks whose 
owners benefit from risk-taking. It may also explain why most banks 
survive. But it cannot explain why a given bank or bank type is more 
profitable than others. This is supported by a study of 244 banks in 44 
countries, which finds no clear relationship between the value of a bank and 
the way it is controlled by the banking supervisor (Caprio, Laeven, & 
Levine, 2007). 
                                                     
14 The mean exceeds this median because the state held very large stakes in a few 
banks around the banking crisis and held 47.8% of the equity in the largest 
commercial bank at the end of the sample period.  
15 The Norwegian Financial Services Authority states that its main purpose is ‘to 
promote financial stability and well functioning markets’ (Finanstilsynet, 2006). 
31 
 
minimum for equity. This tendency would be particularly strong when the 
industry is growing fast. The start of our sample period coincides with the 
beginning of a deregulation regime which gave banks more flexibility, 
including the ability to compete on interest rates (Moe, Solheim, & Vale, 
2004). We would therefore expect overinvesting non-PCC banks to be more 
equity constrained than other banks under such market conditions. 
Table 11 does not support this hypothesis. The average equity 
capitalization ratio is 9.8% in non-PCCs and 7.1% in commercial banks. The 
former is significantly larger than the latter in 15 of the 18 sample years, and 
the maximum ratio in any year is normally more than twice as large in non-
PCCs. 16 Consequently, ownerless banks are further away from minimum 
equity requirements than owned banks. This suggests that the inability to 
raise new equity does not discipline ownerless banks in ways that substitute 
well for owner monitoring.17
Competition is our third candidate to substitute for ownership. The 
general idea is that more competition reduces admissible inefficiency in any 
enterprise, regardless of its organizational form. This means that when 
competition is soft, it takes actively monitoring owners to ensure high 
managerial effort, but the firm may still survive due to its market power even 
if such owner qualities are missing. In contrast, firms facing strong 
competition will fail under low managerial effort, regardless of whether the 
owners are strong, weak, or nonexistent. Thus, market pressure and the 
agents’ incentives to extend effort in order to maintain their human capital 
jointly create the urge to expend effort. This makes performance independent 
of monitoring quality under strong competition, whereas the two are 
positively related when competition is soft. 
 
The very limited empirical literature supports this logic. (Palmer, 
1973) finds that ownership structure and performance correlate more 
                                                     
16 The legal minimum ratio uses a weighting system across the asset classes. As we 
cannot reconstruct this weighting exactly, we use unweighted assets, defining the 
capital coverage ratio as equity plus subordinated debt divided by assets. However, 
as non-PCCs have less risky assets than PCCs and commercials, they would have 
had even higher relative capitalization ratios if we could use the correct weighting 
formula. The upward shift in capitalization in 1992 and 1993 coincides with the end 
of the banking crisis and the implementation of the Basel accord. Equity 
capitalization is highest in all three bank types around 1995, moving slowly 
downwards thereafter. 
17 Notice also that although the free cash flow of a non-PCC bank is automatically 
suppressed by the inability to raise equity, the opposite effect comes from the fact 
that all earnings are retained. (Easterbrook, 1984) argues that dividend payout and 
the resulting need to issue stock for investments purposes is a powerful governance 
mechanism. Hence, the non-PCC bank is neither disciplined by the cash drain from 
dividend payments nor by the scrutiny of the capital market in equity issues. It does 
not seem that this lack of discipline induces overinvestment. 
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strongly the higher the firm’s market power. (Giroud & Mueller, 2010) study 
what happens to firms when takeover threats fall through the passage of 
statewide antitakeover law. They find that in industries with strong product 
market competition, neither the firm’s market value nor its operating 
performance changes as the takeover threat falls. In contrast, firms in non-
competitive industries experience abnormally low stock returns and 
operating performance. Similarly, a companion paper finds that firms in non-
competitive industries benefit more from improved governance quality than 
similar firms in competitive industries (Giroud & Mueller, 2011). 
The potential sources of competitive pressure in our setting are the 
product market, the labor market, and the market for corporate control. The 
latter source cannot explain our findings, since ownerless firms cannot be 
traded. Labor market competition is probably rather weak, since overall 
unemployment is only 4.2% on average and never exceeds 6.0% in the 
sample period.18
Product market competition is the stronger candidate for 
rationalizing our results. We have already pointed out that all banks in the 
sample have access to the same product market, and that there are no major 
economic or regulatory barriers to entry. Moreover, the Norwegian banking 
market is reasonably competitive by international standards.
 However, the demand for managerial talent may be modest 
in smaller communities. Thus, savings bank managers in particular may be 
disciplined by potential loss of human capital when the bank is 
underperforming. 
19
Our setting does not allow for such an ideal test. We choose a related 
approach by analyzing whether an individual bank’s local competitive 
environment influences its performance relative to the performance of other 
banks. The base-case model is augmented by a firm-specific competition 
proxy. Moreover, we interact this competition proxy with the bank type. We 
alternatively measure competition by the number of branches and by the 
number of unique banks present in the same municipalities as the bank in 
question. Both measures account for the fraction of the bank’s total assets 
that is exposed to competition in the different municipalities.
 However, this 
is at best only indirect evidence. To fully test the competition hypothesis, 
one would need two industries with both owned firms and ownerless firms, 
and where competition is strong in one industry and weak in the other. 
According to the theory, owned firms would only outperform ownerless 
firms in the non-competitive industry. 
20
                                                     
18 Source: Statistics Norway. 
 
19 Data for the period 1990-2002 shows that market concentration in Norwegian 
banking is medium among 16 European countries and consistently lower than 
elsewhere in Scandinavia. Source: Central Bank of Norway. 
20 We are grateful to Charlotte Ostergaard, Ibolya Schindele and Bent Vale, who 
generously made their hand-collected data set on bank industry competition 
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The findings are reported in table 12, where Branch comp and Bank 
comp are the branch-based and bank-based competition measures, 
respectively. For the sample period as a whole, three features emerge which 
are consistent with the competition logic. First, the bank type dummies are 
no longer significant determinants of relative performance. Thus, the type of 
stakeholder control is irrelevant for performance differences once 
competitive pressure is taken into account. This result supports the idea that 
competition is a stronger disciplining device than the allocation of cash flow 
rights and control rights. Second, the interaction terms between competition 
and bank type are negative and significant for commercial banks in both 
models. Hence, more competition reduces the importance of cross-sectional 
differences in stakeholder structure for differences in performance. Third, 
the insignificant competition dummies suggest that competition per se does 
nothing to performance levels. This is consistent with the theoretical result 
that the net effect of competition on performance levels is ambiguous.21
During the banking crisis, the relationship between competition and 
performance differences is stronger statistically and economically than in the 
full period. Finally, like in the full period, the stakeholder structure is 
irrelevant in the post-crisis period. The interaction terms are not significant. 
 
These findings show that product market competition is an important 
determinant of the relationship between the firm’s stakeholder structure and 
its performance. This evidence is in line with recent findings from a setting 
which does not involve ownerless firms, but where, instead, monitoring 
quality provided by stockholders varies cross-sectionally (Giroud & Mueller, 
2010; 2011). We conclude that among the alternative economic reasons why 
ownerless firms are not underperforming relative to owned firms, product 
market competition is the only reason that is consistent with the evidence. 
Give our results, one may wonder what remains of the classic 
arguments for organizing ownerless banks (Hansmann, 1996). Although this 
question is outside the scope of our paper, our findings may still shed some 
light on the answer. Unlike in earlier periods, it does not seem true anymore 
that their customers (i.e., lenders and borrowers) would face excessive 
contracting costs in commercial banks, that they have particularly 
homogenous preferences as a group, that they would lack regulatory 
protection against moral hazard by commercial bank owners, or that 
                                                                                                                            
available to us. Among the six competition measures used in (Ostergaard, Schindele, 
& Vale, 2009), we report our findings for the two measures that produce the cleanest 
results. The findings for the four other measures are available upon request. 
21 More competition produces stronger incentives for agents to work harder. This is 
because more competition reduces profits, which increases liquidation risk and 
reduces the value of firm-specific investment. But more competition also reduces 
product prices and thereby erodes the value of cost-reducing effort. These opposing 
effects may make it optimal for the principal to induce less effort (Schmidt, 1997). 
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ownerless banks are so small that their agency costs are negligible. 
Nevertheless, our findings are inconsistent with the argument that because 
ownerless firms retain all their earnings and are immune to the market for 
corporate control, they represent the only firm type in our sample that can 
survive long after having lost their competitive advantage as an 
organizational form (Hansmann, 1996, p. 262). If this were a valid 
explanation, banks organized as nonprofits would have had the weakest 
performance. This is not what we find. Rather, it seems that once one 
accounts for the effect of competition, organizational form becomes, at best, 
of secondary importance to performance. 
2.5 Summary and conclusion 
Economists tend to take for granted that when residual cash flow rights are 
separated from control rights, closer monitoring by stockholders will 
improve the firm’s economic performance. Similarly, we seldom question 
the conventional wisdom that stockholders will lose if they internalize 
welfare effects of their actions on other stakeholders, such as customers and 
employees. Our paper challenges these ideas by analyzing whether the 
existence of multiple corporate objectives and stakeholders with residual 
cash flow rights matter for the firm’s economic performance. 
We compare the return to capital invested in multiple objective firms 
organized as nonprofits (i.e., ownerless firms, where no stakeholder has both 
control rights and residual cash flow rights) to the return in profit-
maximizing firms owned by stockholders. This setting allows us to analyze 
whether firms can be successful without owners rather than the more narrow 
question of whether the ownership structure matters for firms that are 
already organized as owned enterprises. 
Our results do not support the idea that performance is higher the 
more profit-dominated the firm’s objectives and the stronger the ownership 
rights of the capital providers. After having accounted for differences in risk, 
size, and unobservable firm and industry effects, we find that ownerless 
firms are not outperformed by firms owned fully or partially by 
stockholders. 
Economic theory would argue that regardless of stakeholder 
structure, managers of firms with potential agency problems can be 
disciplined by other governance mechanisms than monitoring by residual 
claimants. For the ownerless firms in our sample, we find that product 
market competition plays such a substitute role. This interpretation is 
supported by similar findings in a setting which does not involve nonprofits, 
but where the monitoring quality provided by stockholders varies cross-
sectionally. Overall, we conclude that once one accounts for the disciplining 
effect of competition on firm behavior, organizational form is no longer a 
primary determinant of performance. 
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Table 1: The distribution of control rights and cash flow rights across stakeholders 
 
Residual cash
Bank type Stockholders Employees Depositors Community flow rights, %
Non-PCC 0 25 37.5 37.5 Nobody
PCC 25 25 25 25 Stockholders: 5-92
Commercial 73 27 0 0 Stockholders: 100
Control rights, % 
The table shows the distribution of control (voting) rights and residual cash flow rights across four 
stakeholder groups in non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and commercial banks during the sample period 
1985-2002. Non-PCC banks have no owners. PCC banks have issued equity securities to the 
general public in terms of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). The remaining equity in PCC banks is 
ownerless. The stakeholder groups are the stockholders, the employees, the depositors, and the 
community.   
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Table 2: Industry characteristics 
All Commercial
Year banks banks All Non-PCC PCC Listed PCC
1985 206 15 191 191
1986 206 16 190 190
1987 172 13 159 159
1988 173 14 159 156 3 0
1989 158 14 144 137 7 4
1990 154 10 144 137 7 3
1991 147 11 136 128 8 4
1992 145 11 134 125 9 4
1993 142 10 132 124 8 4
1994 141 9 132 122 10 8
1995 140 8 132 118 14 12
1996 141 8 133 117 16 13
1997 137 7 130 114 16 14
1998 137 7 130 109 21 19
1999 134 4 130 107 23 20
2000 135 4 131 107 24 22
2001 132 3 129 105 24 22
2002 129 2 127 103 24 22
All Commercial
Year banks banks All Non-PCC PCC
1985 653 376 276 276
1986 782 471 311 311
1987 951 542 409 409
1988 925 537 388 259 129
1989 928 579 348 199 149
1990 925 589 336 197 139
1991 858 551 307 143 164
1992 816 517 299 134 165
1993 775 469 307 138 169
1994 776 456 320 121 199
1995 792 456 336 118 219
1996 921 549 372 124 248
1997 996 585 411 133 278
1998 1051 603 448 131 317
1999 1147 619 528 138 389
2000 1258 665 593 159 434
2001 1083 440 642 169 473
2002 1113 432 680 182 499
Total assets 931 524 406 186 265
All Commercial
banks banks All Non-PCC PCC
Mean 5.4 78.3 2.5 1.4 20.2
Std 22.6 98.0 9.9 3.2 33.9
Median 0.7 43.5 0.7 0.7 7.9
Min 0.03 10.2 0.03 0.03 0.50
Max 238.7 238.7 125.7 28.6 134.6
Panel (a) shows the total number of Norwegian banks (All banks), the number of listed
commercial banks, savings banks (non-PCC banks and PCC banks), and listed PCC banks.
Panel (b) shows aggregate total assets per bank type. Panel (c) shows the mean total assets for
an individual bank, its standard deviation, the median, minimum, and maximum. Non-PCC banks
are ownerless savings banks), and PCC banks used to be ownerless savings banks that
transformed themselves into PCC savings banks by issuing equity securities to the general public 
in terms of Primary Capital Certificates (PCC). Commercial banks are regular stock
companies.The figures in panels (b) and (c) are in billion NOK as of year 2002. The sample is
all non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks over the period 1985-2002.
Savings banks
(a): Number of banks
(b): Aggregate size per bank type
(c): Size per bank
Savings banks
Savings banks
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Table 3: Interest rates 
Savings Commercial Savings Commercial Savings Commercial
Year banks banks banks banks banks banks
1992 13.85 14.32 8.02 8.24 5.83 6.08
1993 11.24 10.83 4.07 4.06 7.17 6.77
1994 10.20 9.74 3.84 3.98 6.36 5.76
1995 9.63 8.78 3.70 3.70 5.93 5.08
1996 8.62 8.03 3.12 3.05 5.51 4.98
1997 8.11 7.17 2.71 2.58 5.40 4.59
1998 11.52 11.44 6.03 6.03 5.49 5.41
1999 9.64 9.45 4.06 4.18 5.58 5.27
2000 10.72 10.37 5.44 5.58 5.27 4.78
2001 10.94 10.39 5.72 5.76 5.22 4.63
2002 10.12 9.93 5.85 5.74 4.27 4.19
Average 10.42 10.04 4.78 4.81 5.64 5.23
Margin
This table reports the average interest rate on home mortgages and on ordinary deposits for all savings
banks (PCCs and non-PCCs) and commercial banks. The margin is the difference between the two rates.
Source: Central Bank of Norway.
Home mortgages Ordinary deposits
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Table 4: Balance sheet structure 
Bank type
Fixed 
assets
Amortizable 
loans
Short-term 
assets
Overdraft 
facilities
Building 
loans Other loans Losses
Non-PCC bank 2.3 73.1 17.6 5.8 2.8 0.3 -2.0
PCC bank 2.8 74.6 16.0 6.2 2.6 0.0 -2.2
Commercial bank 3.2 49.1 21.3 7.9 2.0 18.9 -2.4
Bank type Equity
Subordinate
d debt
Due to 
customers
Due to 
banks
Other 
liabilities
Non-PCC bank 8.6 0.3 75.0 9.5 6.6
PCC bank 5.3 3.0 63.0 13.6 15.2
Commercial bank 5.0 3.2 47.0 18.9 25.8
All figures in this table are reported as percentages of total assets, and they are value weighted averages across banks
and equally weighted across years. Fixed assets in panel (a) is buildings and investments in affiliated companies, and
Amortizable loans is loans that involve gradual repayment of the principal. Short-term assets is cash, cash equivalents and
securities held for trading, while Overdraft facilities is trade credits and other fixed limit loans. Building loans is fixed limit
loans, and Other loans is every remaining loan type, such as credit card debt and leasing. Losses is allowances for losses
on all loan portfolios. Equity in panel (b) is total funds for savings banks (including PCC capital for PCC banks) and total
shareholder equity for commercial banks. Subordinated debt is debt that can be regarded as capital for capital requirement
purposes, Due to customers is regular deposits from customers, Due to banks is inter-bank loans including loans from the
central bank, and Other liabilities is securites issued. The sample is all Norwegian Non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed
commercial banks over the period 1985-2002.
(a): Assets
(b): Liabilities
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Table 5: Return on assets 
Year 1: Non-PCC 2: PCC 3: Com  1 - 2  2 - 3  1 - 3
1985 0.43 0.35 0.08
(1.57)
1986 0.46 0.35 0.11*
(1.79)
1987 0.55 0.07 0.49***
(4.60)
1988 0.40 -0.15 -0.97 0.55*** 0.82 1.37*
(3.20) (1.02) (1.74)
1989 0.64 -0.05 -0.51 0.69*** 0.46 1.15
(2.86) (0.52) (1.36)
1990 0.50 -1.00 -0.19 1.50 -0.81 0.69**
(1.37) (-0.71) (2.31)
1991 0.33 -1.14 -1.91 1.47** 0.78 2.25**
(2.04) (0.71) (2.61)
1992 2.60 0.01 -0.59 2.58*** 0.60 3.18***
(2.85) (0.50) (3.93)
1993 1.41 1.55 0.98 -0.13 0.57* 0.44***
(-0.45) (1.82) (3.65)
1994 1.15 0.99 0.96 0.16 0.03 0.19
(1.32) (0.14) (0.88)
1995 1.27 0.80 1.16 0.47 -0.37 0.10
(1.58) (-0.98) (0.43)
1996 0.67 0.56 0.92 0.11 -0.36 -0.25
(1.05) (-1.34) (-0.99)
1997 1.06 0.84 1.03 0.22 -0.19 0.03
(1.58) (-0.98) (0.19)
1998 0.83 0.80 0.74 0.03 0.06 0.09
(0.40) (0.49) (0.89)
1999 1.11 1.05 0.92 0.06 0.14 0.20
(0.72) (0.95) (1.59)
2000 1.18 1.00 0.91 0.17* 0.09 0.27**
(1.92) (0.66) (2.20)
2001 0.76 0.66 0.86 0.10 -0.20 -0.10
(1.07) (-1.19) (-0.67)
2002 0.52 0.22 0.63 0.31 -0.41** -0.11
(1.56) (-2.18) (-1.66)
1988-1992 0.89 -0.46 -0.84 1.36*** 0.37 1.73***
(5.49) (0.65) (8.33)
1993-2002 1.00 0.85 0.91 0.15*** -0.06 0.09
(5.26) (-1.72) (0.98)
1985-2002 0.88 0.41 0.32 0.47*** 0.09*** 0.57***
(4.19) (3.07) (9.51)
(a): Mean ROA (b): Difference
This table shows the mean return on assets (ROA) across the three bank types. ROA is net
income divided by total assets. The mean ROA per year is equally weighted across firms, and the
average over multiple years at the bottom of the table is equally weighted across years. We report 
the mean for each bank type, the pairwise difference in means, and its t-value in brackets.
Statistically significant differences at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as *, **, and ***,
respectively. The sample is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial
banks.
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Table 6: Base-case perfomance regressions
Independent variable 1985-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002
PCC -0.181** -1.510*** -0.095*
(-2.27) (-4.63) (-1.70)
Com -0.765*** -2.741*** -0.119
(-5.61) (-6.84) (-0.96)
Asset risk 1.419*** 1.352* 1.321***
(5.27) (1.74) (5.89)
Liability risk 0.836*** 4.385*** -0.482***
(3.65) (6.33) (-2.71)
Bank size -0.063*** -0.219*** 0.053***
(-2.78) (-3.18) (2.95)
Adj. R2, % 31.11 37.20 33.08
Wald chi2 1110.67 450.40 736.30
Prob. of chi2, % 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 2660 738 1362
The table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants
as specified in the leftmost column. Performance is measured as return on assets
(ROA), which we operationalize as net income divided by total assets at year end.
PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank
(Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which
is not cash, claims on the central bank, amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability
risk is one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower these
two measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in
constant 2002 NOK.
The model is estimated with fixed time effects and random firm effects. We
report the estimated regression coefficients and its t-statistic in brackets.
Statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as
*, **, and ***, respectively. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted
R2, the Wald chi2, its p-value, and the number of observations. The sample is all
Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks.
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Table 7: Alternative estimation techniques 
Independent
variable (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Constant 1.835*** 6.437*** 2.020***
(4.80) (5.93) (6.60)
PCC -0.181**-0.319***-0.316***-1.510***-1.168***-1.098*** -0.095* -0.206***-0.157***
(-2.27) (-4.75) (-4.00) (-4.63) (-4.55) (-3.65) (-1.70) (-4.99) (-3.36)
Com -0.765***-0.745***-0.922***-2.741***-2.156***-2.092*** -0.119 -0.321*** -0.074
(-5.61) (-7.71) (-8.52) (-6.84) (-7.72) (-6.39) (-0.96) (-3.94) (-0.84)
Asset risk 1.419*** 2.001*** 0.256 1.352* 2.074*** 1.211*** 1.321*** 1.923*** 2.461***
 (5.27) (8.78) (1.12) (1.74) (3.16) (1.81) (5.89) (10.40) (12.22)
Liability risk 0.836*** 0.799*** 0.696*** 4.385*** 3.171*** 2.587***-0.482*** -0.132 -0.591***
(3.65) (4.22) (3.27) (6.33) (6.18) (4.36) (-2.71) (-0.89) (-3.71)
Bank size -0.063***-0.057*** -0.015 -0.219***-0.223***-0.187***0.053*** 0.064*** 0.053***
(-2.78) (-3.97) (-0.93) (-3.18) (-5.28) (-3.80) (2.95) (5.72) (4.17)
Year dummies yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no
Random effects yes no no yes no no yes no no
Adj. R2, % 31,11 30,88 3,76 37,20 37,10 13,92 33,08 33,43 12,97
F-value (Wald chi2) 1110,67 55,00 21,77 450,40 49,30 23,68 736,30 49,83 41,58
Probability of F, % 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
n 2660 2660 2660 738 738 738 1362 1362 1362
In the Year dummies row, a yes (no) reflects that we include (do not include) a time dummy to capture time-
varying fixed effects. A yes (no) in the Random effects row means that we use (do not use) random
effects estimation to capture unobserved heterogeneity at the firm level. We report the estimated regression
coefficients and its t-statistic in brackets. Statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level
are labelled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, the F-
value (Wald chi2 for random effects regressions), the corresponding p-value, and the number of
observations.
1985-2002 1993-20021988-1992
The table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants as specified in the
leftmost column. The models (a), (b), and (c) represent three alternative ways of handling the panel data
structure as specified in the two first rows in the bottom section of the table. Performance is measured as
return on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net income divided by total assets at year end. PCC
(Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and zero otherwise.
Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, amortizable loans, or fixed
assets. Liability risk is one minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower these two
measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. The sample
is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks.
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Table 8: Size matching and ROA risk 
Independent
variable 1985-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002 1985-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002
PCC -0.220 -0.289* -0.145 -0.027 -0.921*** -0.033
(-1.18) (-1.84) (-0.84) (-0.38) (-3.44) (-0.63)
Com -0.652** -0.639*** -0.570*** -0.466*** -1.156*** -0.154
(-2.57) (-3.75) (-3.06) (-3.90) (-4.12) (-1.29)
Asset risk 1.578 2.135* -3.106***
(1.25) (1.76) (-2.89)
Liability risk 0.927* 0.965 0.376
(1.80) (2.66) (0.97)
ROA risk -28.422*** -26.734*** -5.046
(-9.03) (-4.65) (-1.41)
Bank size -0.032 -0.031 0.045 -0.073*** -0.125** 0.016
(-0.38) (-0.63) (0.87) (-3.60) (-2.54) (0.89)
Adj. R2, % 28.27 16.79 30.27 38.95 46.26 25.17
Wald chi2 162.34 24.27 101.60 1451.59 738.56 2778.02
Prob. of chi2, % 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 473 145 229 2236 725 1220
This table reestimates the base-case model with size-matched samples in panel (a), and by
using the volatility of ROA as a proxy for risk in panel (b). We only include savings banks in
panel (a) that are larger than the smallest commercial bank, while ensuring that the sample
has at least as many non-PCC banks as commercial banks. Performance is measured as
return on assets (ROA), which we operationalize as net income divided by total assets at
year end. PCC (Com) is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank
(Commercial bank) and zero otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not
cash, claims on the central bank, amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability risk is one
minus deposits divided by total assets. We assume that the lower these two measures, the
smaller the risk. ROA risk in panel (b) is measured as the standard deviation of ROA over a
3-year window. Bank size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK.
The sample is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks. All
regressions account for time-varying industry effects and random firm effects. We report
the estimated regression coefficients and its t-statistic in brackets. Statistically significant
relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The
bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, the Wald chi2 statistic, its p-value, and the
number of observations.
(a): Size matching (b): ROA risk
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Table 9: Alternative performance measures 
Independent 
variable
Gross 
return on 
assets
Return on 
equity
Profit 
margin
Interest 
rate 
margin
Gross 
return on 
assets
Return on 
equity
Profit 
margin
Interest 
rate 
margin
Gross 
return on 
assets
Return on 
equity
Profit 
margin
Interest 
rate 
margin
PCC -0.383*** -11.516*** -2.640*** 0.247*** -1.483*** -1.510*** -11.217*** 0.148 -0.256*** -0.974 -1.546* 0.116**
(-4.70) (-3.14) (-3.96) (6.13) (-4.88) (-4.63) (-4.83) (1.49) (-4.02) (-1.57) (-1.95) (2.46)
Com -0.447*** -28.526*** -5.915*** -0.272** -2.478*** -2.741*** -18.471*** -0.695*** 0.489*** 1.713 -1.074 -0.839***
(-3.09) (-5.39) (-5.43) (-2.04) (-6.76) (-6.84) (-6.77) (-4.25) (3.44) (1.29) (-0.60) (-5.33)
Asset risk 1.079*** -1.221 15.441*** -0.550*** 0.264 -0.219*** 13.249** -0.814*** 1.223*** 1.793*** 18.380*** 0.002
(3.92) (-1.56) (6.82) (-4.09) (0.37) (-3.18) (2.43) (-3.24) (4.79) (9.50) (5.87) (0.01)
Liability risk 1.452*** 29.160*** 4.362** -2.211*** 5.302*** 4.385*** 29.663*** -2.625*** 1.068*** -7.134*** -10.964*** -1.804***
(6.14) (2.83) (2.29) (-17.29) (8.29) (6.33) (6.14) (-11.20) (5.26) (-3.55) (-4.33) (-12.35)
Size 0.045* 15.109 -0.191 -0.185*** -0.084 1.352 -1.699*** -0.111*** 0.077*** -3.013 1.096*** -0.093***
(1.86) (1.22) (-1.08) (-8.28) (-1.34) (1.74) (-3.72) (-3.73) (3.76) (-1.19) (4.26) (-3.86)
Adj. R2 77.27 3.45 40.23 68.02 30.21 37.2 42.02 63.79 69.79 35.08 24.43 69.23
Wald chi2 9933 94 1749 23172 359 450 548 616 3916 630 460 19362
Prob. of chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 2660 2652 2660 2660 738 738 738 738 1362 1362 1362 1362
We report the estimated regression coefficients and its t-statistic in brackets. Statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as 
*, **, and ***, respectively. The bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, the Wald chi2, its p-value, and the number of observations. The sample is all 
Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks .
Accounting for random firm effects and time-varying industry effects, this table re-estimates the base-case model under four alternative performance measures
specified at the top of each column. Gross return on assets is income before funding costs divided by assets, return on equity is net income divided by book
equity, profit margin is net income divided by revenues, and interest rate margin is net interest income divided by assets. Asset risk is measured as the fraction
of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank, amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability risk is operationalized as one minus deposits divided by total
assets. We assume that the larger these two measures, the higher the risk. Size is the log of the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK.
1985 – 2002 1988 - 1992 1993 - 2002
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Table 10: Ownership structure 
Year PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com
1989 3.0 0.0 30.0 23.3 37.7 29.7 13.3 28.5 14.0 16.6
1990 3.3 0.0 28.0 25.4 42.8 31.9 13.2 24.3 10.5 16.8
1991 2.5 3.7 30.5 26.6 48.3 20.0 11.2 35.0 5.2 12.9
1992 2.4 10.8 38.6 24.9 35.8 25.4 18.6 28.9 2.6 8.1
1993 12.0 17.3 37.4 22.3 25.4 25.4 18.8 23.6 4.2 9.3
1994 6.8 13.0 33.5 21.5 28.6 21.4 25.0 32.3 4.3 9.6
1995 5.2 12.3 43.9 21.1 16.9 21.3 29.2 24.8 2.8 18.3
1996 2.1 11.6 50.5 19.8 13.9 26.1 27.0 21.4 4.4 19.3
1997 2.6 11.6 52.6 19.0 13.4 25.9 25.5 22.8 3.9 18.9
1998 2.4 11.6 50.7 18.4 19.5 23.2 22.3 21.1 3.2 23.8
1999 2.0 16.7 55.2 22.2 15.3 23.5 20.9 22.5 4.3 13.8
2000 2.0 15.0 55.3 24.2 15.2 29.8 20.4 21.2 5.1 8.2
2001 2.0 12.4 54.0 24.0 15.4 30.2 19.5 21.0 6.8 10.4
2002 1.8 13.2 55.7 24.2 16.4 24.6 19.5 22.2 4.5 13.8
Average 2.9 9.8 48.7 22.4 20.0 25.7 21.3 25.3 5.0 14.9
PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com PCC Com
1989 18.3 11.7 9.5 10.0 36.2 33.7 27.0 31.0
1990 9.8 14.8 9.5 13.0 31.3 34.8 31.0 32.0
1991 20.3 14.0 12.5 11.0 39.5 41.7 33.0 43.0
1992 10.0 22.1 11.0 17.5 29.2 47.5 33.0 43.0
1993 16.2 23.8 7.0 11.0 31.4 42.4 25.0 34.0
1994 11.0 19.9 6.5 11.5 26.8 39.6 23.5 32.0
1995 8.6 19.6 6.0 13.0 20.9 35.9 19.0 28.0
1996 6.1 18.6 4.5 10.0 15.7 37.1 13.0 32.0
1997 4.6 17.0 4.5 10.0 13.5 40.9 14.0 44.0
1998 4.8 16.2 5.0 10.0 15.4 37.0 15.0 39.0
1999 6.1 15.7 6.0 9.5 16.4 36.7 18.0 31.5
2000 7.0 16.6 7.0 10.0 17.1 38.4 17.0 28.0
2001 7.4 16.6 8.0 10.0 18.0 36.2 18.0 32.0
2002 7.4 16.6 8.0 10.0 19.0 37.0 19.0 28.0
Average 8.1 17.2 6.0 10.0 20.1 38.3 18.0 35.5
(b): Ownership concentration
(a): Owner types
ForeignState Personal Financial Industrial
Panel (a) reports the mean ownership fraction per firm across five owner types
in PCC banks and commercial banks. Panel (b) shows the mean and median
ownership fraction for the largest owner and for the five largest owners,
respectively. We exclude observations where the largest owner holds 90% or
more. The sample is all Norwegian PCC banks and listed commercial banks.
Five largest owners
Mean Median
Largest owner
Mean Median
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Table 11: Capitalisation ratio across years and bank types 
1 2 3
Year  Non-PCC PCC Com  1 - 2  2 - 3  1 - 3 Max Min Max Min Max Min
1985 6.11 5.54 0.57 13.95 2.36 9.17 3.86
(1.28)
1986 5.82 6.12 -0.30 14.00 0.00 9.91 3.51
(-0.69)
1987 7.01 5.53 1.48*** 18.31 2.29 8.72 3.36
(3.45)
1988 6.82 5.78 5.01 1.04 0.77 1.81* 16.98 -1.62 7.18 4.67 7.93 -6.84
(1.34) (0.63) (1.83)
1989 7.41 5.43 4.86 1.97*** 0.57 2.54* 17.36 3.32 7.55 2.87 7.55 -11.55
(3.40) (0.41) (1.94)
1990 7.86 4.29 5.82 3.57** -1.53 2.04*** 17.50 1.03 7.50 -3.53 8.31 2.94
(2.48) (-1.02) (3.73)
1991 7.71 5.63 6.13 2.08*** -0.50 1.58** 17.97 -16.20 8.67 2.70 9.67 4.22
(2.86) (-0.61) (2.59)
1992 10.70 6.67 7.60 4.03*** -0.93 3.11*** 19.30 4.70 10.36 0.43 12.35 4.79
(4.05) (-0.80) (4.32)
1993 11.53 9.10 11.33 2.43*** -2.23 0.20 21.46 6.30 10.98 6.14 28.62 5.80
(3.62) (-1.07) (0.10)
1994 12.27 9.23 9.47 3.05*** -0.24 2.81*** 22.43 5.77 11.95 7.72 11.31 8.35
(6.15) (-0.50) (6.85)
1995 13.03 10.20 9.97 2.83*** 0.23 3.06*** 24.20 6.27 16.53 7.44 12.75 8.59
(3.81) (0.28) (5.08)
1996 13.23 10.91 8.78 2.31*** 2.13** 4.45*** 26.06 6.52 19.09 8.47 10.20 6.87
(2.86) (2.51) (7.84)
1997 12.93 10.90 8.86 2.03** 2.04** 4.07*** 26.40 7.29 19.04 7.55 10.07 6.78
(2.24) (2.16) (7.45)
1998 12.88 10.78 9.29 2.10*** 1.49* 3.59*** 25.96 7.22 18.23 5.51 10.90 6.54
(2.77) (1.72) (5.53)
1999 12.85 10.58 8.66 2.27*** 1.91* 4.18*** 26.88 8.31 17.70 6.72 10.63 6.65
(3.42) (1.88) (4.58)
2000 12.51 10.00 8.78 2.51*** 1.23 3.74*** 26.65 7.82 17.32 6.32 10.92 6.72
(4.27) (1.22) (3.92)
2001 11.98 9.65 8.12 2.33*** 1.52* 3.85*** 26.15 7.29 16.10 7.09 9.51 6.78
(4.53) (1.72) (4.53)
2002 11.49 9.16 7.74 2.33*** 1.42 3.74*** 26.75 6.90 15.92 5.25 8.78 6.70
(4.44) (1.27) (3.42)
Average 9.82 9.38 7.14 0.44*** 2.24 2.68*** 21.57 3.64 13.61 5.02 10.96 4.12
(3.48) (0.65) (3.76)
This table shows distributional characteristics of the capitalisation ratio, which we operationalize as the
book value of equity plus subordinated loans divided by the book value of assets. Statistically significant
relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all
Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed commercial banks.
Difference in meansMean values
Non-PCC PCC Com
Extreme values
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Table 12: Product market competition 
Independent variable
PCC -0.039 0.144 0.687 1.478** -0.105 -0.117
(-0.32) (0.87) (1.08) (2.09) (-1.56) (-1.31)
Com -0.001 0.283 -0.640 -0.262 -0.205 -0.161
(0.00) (0.83) (-1.40) (-0.46) (-1.23) (-0.76)
Asset risk 1.570*** 1.570*** 1.436** 1.441** 1.318*** 1.296***
(4.95) (4.91) (2.07) (2.01) (6.18) (6.04)
Liability risk 1.240*** 1.305*** 5.689*** 6.081*** -0.291 -0.290
(3.84) (4.05) (6.51) (6.89) (-1.49) (-1.48)
Bank size -0.081** -0.089** -0.273*** -0.269*** 0.043** 0.040**
(-2.27) (-2.47) (-4.31) (-4.16) (2.48) (2.32)
Branch comp 0.009 -0.008 0.017
(0.17) (-0.08) (0.62)
Branch comp * PCC -0.208 -6.107*** 0.019
(-1.14) (-3.92) (0.21)
Branch comp * Com -3.667*** -6.035*** 0.097
(-7.01) (-7.23) (0.27)
Bank comp 0.002 0.014 -0.003
(0.09) (0.29) (-0.20)
Bank comp * PCC -0.180* -2.498*** 0.016
(-1.91) (-4.69) (0.33)
Bank comp * Com -1.490*** -2.477*** -0.003
(-5.78) (-5.82) (-0.02)
Adj. R2, % 32.49 32.59 44.79 43.96 34.70 34.55
Wald chi2 1098.14 1078.09 600.55 579.32 777.74 777.58
Prob. of chi2, % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
n 2209 2209 717 717 1348 1348
The table relates a bank's economic performance to its hypothesized determinants as
specified in the leftmost column. Performance is measured as return on assets (ROA),
which we operationalize as net income divided by total assets at year end. PCC (Com) is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the bank is a PCC bank (Commercial bank) and zero
otherwise. Asset risk is the fraction of assets which is not cash, claims on the central bank,
amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability risk is one minus deposits divided by total assets.
We assume that the lower these two measures, the smaller the risk. Bank size is the log of
the bank's assets in constant 2002 NOK. Competition is alternatively measured by the
number of branches (Branch comp) and by the number of unique banks (Bank comp)
operating in the same municipalities as the bank in question. Both measures account for the
fraction of the bank’s total assets that is exposed to competition in the different 
The model is estimated with fixed time effects and random firm effects. We report the
estimated regression coefficients and its t-statistic in brackets. Statistically significant
relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The
bottom section of the table shows the adjusted R2, the Wald chi2, its p-value, and the number
of observations. The sample is all Norwegian non-PCC banks, PCC banks, and listed
commercial banks.
1985-2002 1988-1992 1993-2002
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3 Stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy:  
A cleaner test1
 
 
With Øyvind Bøhren and Pål E. Steen 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper compares the dividend policy of firms controlled by owners to 
firms where owners are a minority relative to non-owning employees, 
customers, and community citizens. Using an approach which avoids a 
serious identification problem in the existing literature, we find that 
regardless of whether owners or non-owners control the firm, the strong 
stakeholder uses the dividend decision to mitigate rather than intensify the 
conflict with the weak stakeholder. This evidence is consistent with the 
substitution model of payout policy, by which power abuse in agency 
conflicts is discouraged by costly consequences at a later stage. 
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3.1 Introduction 
Stockholders invest in firms to obtain returns on their investment. However, 
conflicts of interest between the firm’s stakeholders may reduce these 
returns. For instance, stockholders may worry that management extracts 
private benefits at stockholders’ expense. If this agency problem appears 
threatening to stockholders, they may hesitate to put their money at 
management’s disposal (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This reluctance to 
finance the firm may have negative effects on the real economy by 
increasing the firm’s cost of capital and decreasing its investment in labor 
and productive assets. 
Our paper analyzes empirically how dividend policy influences the 
seriousness of this conflict between the firm’s owners and non-owners. In 
particular, we study whether firms use their dividend payout to mitigate or 
intensify the conflict. Overall, we find that the larger the potential agency 
problem, the more of the firm’s earnings is paid out as dividends. This is 
consistent with the notion that reduction of agency costs is an important 
concern when firms choose their dividend policy. 
The conflict between owners and non-owners has been called the 
first agency problem in the corporate governance literature (Villalonga & 
Amit, 2006). The institutional setting of our sample firms allows us to focus 
on this first agency problem while ignoring the second, which concerns 
conflicts between large owners and small owners.2
The outcome model predicts that when given the opportunity, non-
owner stakeholders will use dividend policy to capture private benefits. In 
contrast, the substitution model argues that non-owner stakeholders will 
benefit from a dividend policy that reduces potential conflicts with the 
owners. Hence, our finding that payout decreases with stockholder power 
supports the substitution model, which holds that stockholder power and 
dividend payout are alternative ways of disciplining non-owner stakeholders. 
  This empirical context 
allows for a cleaner test than earlier of the two existing theories of how 
dividends interact with stakeholder conflicts. These theories are the outcome 
model and the substitution model, respectively (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). 
                                                     
2  Higher ownership concentration reduces the first agency problem, but may 
increase the second (Becht, Bolton, & Röell, 2003). The first agency problem is 
considered the more serious in common law countries, whereas the second is 
thought to dominate under civil law, where ownership concentration is generally 
higher (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The first agency problem has been analyzed as 
conflicts of interest between owners and managers or between owners and creditors 
(Becht, Bolton, & Röell, 2003), but much less as a conflict between owners and 
other stakeholders, such as workers (Fauver & Fuerst, 2006). The empirical 
literature on the second agency problem has focused on the majority stockholders’ 
expropriation of the minority (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 2001). 
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Most existing empirical tests relate stakeholder conflicts to dividend 
policy by regressing the firm’s payout on its ownership concentration (Khan, 
2006; Moh'd, Perry, & Rimbey, 1995; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2007; 
Rozeff, 1982; Szilagyi & Renneboog, 2007). Unfortunately, this approach 
creates a serious ambiguity which is due to the fact that a given dividend 
theory makes opposite predictions for how ownership concentration relates 
to dividends under the two agency problems. By allowing ownership 
concentration to vary widely across the sample firms, the relative importance 
of the two agency problems varies correspondingly. Therefore, one cannot 
tell which dividend theory is consistent with the data. In particular, the most 
common finding in the literature is that dividends fall as ownership 
concentration grows. This is consistent with the substitution model in firms 
where the first agency problem is more serious than the second. If the second 
agency problem dominates, however, the data is in line with the outcome 
model. 
Such ambiguities may be avoided by ensuring that one of the two 
agency problems remains constant across the sample firms. Hence, 
ownership concentration should be relatively stable in the cross-section. In 
other words: Cross-sectional differences in stakeholder power should come 
from other sources than differences in ownership concentration. Our 
approach meets this requirement. 
We study an environment where the second agency problem (i.e., 
conflicts between large and small owners) is small because a binding legal 
constraint makes ownership concentration low in every firm. In contrast, the 
potential seriousness of the first agency problem (i.e., conflicts between 
owners and non-owners) varies more than usual, but not because of cross-
sectional differences in ownership concentration. Rather, it varies due to 
differences in organizational form, which allocates majority control to the 
owners in one firm type and to the non-owner stakeholders (employees, 
customers, and community citizens) in the other. Thus, (i) ownership 
concentration is unusually low in both firm types, and (ii) owners are strong 
relative to other stakeholders in one firm type and weak in the other. 
Our sample is the population of listed Norwegian commercial banks 
and savings banks. Commercial banks are regular stock companies that are 
controlled by their owners. In contrast, the owners of a savings bank hold 
only one fourth of the control rights. The remaining part is split equally 
between employees, depositors, and the municipality. In either 
organizational form, no single stockholder or alliance of stockholders can 
own or vote for more than one tenth of the equity. Both organizational forms 
face the same product market opportunities and the same regulatory 
constraints. 
We test the predictions of the two competing dividend models under 
the first agency problem. The outcome model predicts that commercial 
banks will pay higher dividends than savings banks. According to this 
50 
 
model, the owners in commercial banks will use their controlling power to 
minimize the cash flow under the non-owner stakeholders’ discretion. 
Correspondingly, the controlling non-owner stakeholders in savings banks 
will ensure their access to a high cash flow by paying low dividends. 
In contrast, the substitution model predicts that commercial banks 
will pay lower dividends than savings banks. The controlling owners of 
commercial banks will use their power to monitor management directly and 
precisely through involvement rather than indirectly and coarsely through 
high dividends. Similarly, the controlling non-owners in savings banks think 
they will benefit later by paying high dividends now because a large payout 
reduces the owners’ fear of expropriation. 
Our major finding is that savings banks, which are controlled by 
non-owner stakeholders, pay significantly higher dividends than the owner-
controlled commercial banks. Also, more is paid out when the bank is small 
and grows fast. These results survive when we control for dividend 
persistence, financial leverage, stock liquidity, ownership structure, and 
unobservable firm and industry effects. The findings are also robust to using 
alternative data sets, econometric techniques, and dividend payout measures. 
This evidence is consistent with the substitution model of how 
dividend payments and stakeholder conflicts interact. It is inconsistent with 
the outcome model. Our findings support the notion that the strong 
stakeholder uses the dividend policy to reduce the agency conflict with the 
weak stakeholder, as this behavior serves the best interest of the strong 
stakeholder in the longer run. This is true regardless of whether the strong 
stakeholder is the owners or the non-owners. 
Section 2 reviews the literature, whereas section 3 makes the basic 
prediction and presents the institutional setting of our sample firms. 
Descriptive statistics follow in section 4, and section 5 reports the statistical 
tests. We conclude in section 6. 
3.2 Existing research 
Studying how the aggregate dividend payout of a country relates to its legal 
regime, (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000) introduce 
the outcome model and the substitution model as two alternative 
perspectives on how stakeholder conflicts and dividends interact.3
                                                     
3 The authors do not develop these two models formally, but regard them as intuitive 
tools for understanding the relationship between dividends and stockholder 
protection across different legal regimes (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & R. 
W. Vishny, 2000, p. 5). Formal models that reflect different components of the La 
Porta et al. logic have been developed by (Fluck, 1999; Gomes, 2000; Myers, 2000; 
Rozeff, 1982). Like (Khan, 2006; Renneboog & Trojanowski, 2007; Szilagyi & 
Renneboog, 2007), we apply the La Porta et al. framework within a given legal 
regime rather than across different regimes. Unlike these papers, however, which 
 We apply 
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this logic to the individual firm within a given legal regime, and we focus on 
the first agency problem. The outcome model rests on the idea that 
stakeholders use their control rights in myopic ways. It predicts that when 
given the power, owners pay high dividends and non-owners pay low 
dividends. This is because a large payout reduces the ability of non-owner 
stakeholders to expropriate owners’ wealth, such as financing perks for 
managers, overprotecting employees, underpricing output to customers, or 
sponsoring community projects. 
The substitution model assumes more sophisticated stakeholders and 
makes the opposite prediction: Owners with power are expected to pay low 
dividends, whereas powerful non-owners pay high dividends. In general, the 
dividend decision in the substitution model is disciplined by potentially 
adverse effects for the controlling party at a later stage. The idea is that 
controlling owners try to influence the firm as directors in the boardroom or 
discussion partners with management rather than by bluntly blocking 
management’s access to liquid assets. Owners also realize that high current 
dividends may create costly underinvestment later This may happen if new 
investors interpret a stock issue as  signals of overvaluation (Goergen, Da 
Silva, & Renneboog, 2005; Myers & Majluf, 1984). Thus, firms with strong 
owners choose low dividends in the substitution model. In contrast, firms 
controlled by non-owners will pay high dividends. These stakeholders 
realize that if they instead retain the earnings and use it to destroy the 
owners’ wealth, they may suffer later on. For instance, management’s pay 
may fall and their career opportunities may deteriorate because the stock 
price drops. Moreover, high dividends may be a way for growing firms to 
build reputation for subsequent equity issues. It may also reduce information 
asymmetry costs for small firms in particular by forcing the firm more often 
to the issue market (Easterbrook, 1984). This suggests that non-owner 
controlled firms with high growth and small size will pay high dividends. 
The existing tests of these two models relate dividends to ownership 
concentration, which is allowed to vary in the cross-section. This approach 
makes the first agency problem dominate in firms where ownership 
concentration is low, whereas the second does in high-concentration firms. 
Figure 1 illustrates the resulting problem for empirical tests. Under the first 
agency problem in the upper half of the figure, the outcome model 
conjectures that higher ownership concentration produces higher dividend 
payments (graph A). In contrast, the substitution model posits that dividends 
will fall (B). Similarly, under the second agency problem in the bottom half 
of the figure, the outcome model predicts that higher ownership 
concentration induces lower dividends. The substitution model predicts the 
                                                                                                                            
vary relative stakeholder power by varying ownership concentration, we vary the 
organizational form across firms that all have low ownership concentration. 
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opposite. Graphs C and D illustrate these two latter hypotheses, 
respectively.4
This setting implies that when the relative importance of the two 
agency problems is allowed to vary across the sample, one cannot infer 
which dividend model has generated the data. In particular, most papers find 
that dividends and ownership concentration are inversely related. This is 
consistent with the substitution model if the first agency problem is more 
serious than the second (graph B). In firms where the second agency 
problem dominates, however, the result is in line with the outcome model 
(C). Correspondingly, a finding that dividends and ownership concentration 
are positively related would be consistent with both A (outcome model) and 
D (substitution model). 
 
To illustrate the inherent identification problem in the literature, 
(Szilagyi & Renneboog, 2007 p. 2) reject the substitution model based on 
their analysis of Dutch firms. They conclude that “…we find no evidence 
that concentrated shareholders would allow firms to relax their dividend 
policy further. Rather, financial institutions and managers who efficiently 
mitigate agency problems as shareholders, actually force higher payouts. In 
other words, it seems that dividends often complement rather than substitute 
shareholders’ efforts to alleviate agency concerns.” When the first agency 
problem is small, however, as the authors implicitly argue in their second 
sentence above, high ownership concentration makes the second agency 
problem the more important. Therefore, their finding that dividends do not 
decrease with increasing ownership concentration questions the outcome 
model and supports the substitution model (graph C vs. graph D in figure 1). 
This is the opposite of what the authors argue. 
A corresponding ambiguity is reflected in the concluding comments 
of (Khan, 2006, p. C186): “To summarise, there are several possible 
explanations for the relationships found between dividends and ownership 
structure. It is possible that shareholders are using dividend policy (i) to 
substitute for poor monitoring abilities/efforts, […] or (ii) to expropriate 
other stakeholders” (Khan (itemization added by us). Interpretation (i) 
applies the substitution model to the first agency problem, whereas (ii) 
applies the outcome model to the second agency problem. 
In general, if one cannot assume that one of the two agency 
problems dominates the sample, one cannot use the observed relationship 
between ownership structure and dividends to distinguish between 
                                                     
4 Graphs C and D implicitly assume that the potential seriousness of the second 
agency problem increases monotonically as ownership concentration grows. This 
may not happen for sufficiently high concentration. For instance, the majority 
stockholder has the strongest incentive to consume high private benefits and pay low 
dividends the closer his holding is to 50 %. 
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alternative explanations of how stakeholder conflicts interact with dividend 
policy. 
3.3 Basic hypothesis and institutional setting 
We avoid the identification problem of existing research by studying firms 
where the second agency problem is small. This is ensured by regulation, 
which allows no owner or alliance of owners to hold or vote for more than 
10 % of the firm’s equity. In contrast, the seriousness of the first agency 
problem varies more than usual due to differences in organizational form 
rather than ownership concentration. The owners hold the majority in 
commercial banks (forretningsbank), which is one of the two organizational 
forms we study. In savings banks (grunnfondsbank), however, owners only 
hold a minority stake, as the firm is controlled by its employees, customers, 
and the community citizens (i.e., non-owner stakeholders). Hence, 
ownership concentration is low and homogenous by an exogenous 
constraint, there is large heterogeneity in stakeholder control rights, and this 
heterogeneity is unrelated to ownership concentration. The other dividend 
determinants are quite homogenous across the sample, as both firm types are 
listed, face the same market opportunities, and are subject to the same 
regulation. 
Our basic hypothesis is illustrated in figure 2. The figure shows that 
according to the outcome model, the first agency problem makes commercial 
banks pay higher dividends than savings banks. The substitution model 
predicts the opposite. Notice also that, unlike in figure 1, the independent 
variable is not ownership concentration, but owner control. 
Table 1 shows how control rights and stockholders’ residual cash 
flow rights are distributed in the two organizational forms. We measure 
control rights as the fraction of the board seats elected for by the stakeholder 
in question. Cash flow rights is the fraction of earnings and equity the 
stockholder can claim. The commercial bank is fully owned and controlled 
by its stockholders, as they hold 73 % of the votes and all the cash flow 
rights. Employees hold the remaining votes for directors and no cash flow 
rights. Thus, commercial banks are like other firms regarding stockholders’ 
ownership rights.5
The stockholders of a savings bank hold only 25 % of its voting 
rights. The remaining 75 % is split equally between employees, depositors, 
and the municipality. Similarly, stockholders cannot claim the full cash flow 
or the full equity, but only a fraction which varies between 5 % and 74 % 
 
                                                     
5 Limited liability firms in Norway with more than 200 employees are required by 
constitutional law to have one third of their directors elected by and among the 
employees. Special regulation reduces this fraction to 27 % for commercial banks. 
All commercial banks in our sample have more than 200 employees. 
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across the sample. This fraction equals the stockholders’ share of the firm’s 
equity. The remaining cash flow rights are ownerless in the sense that no 
stakeholder can claim any part of it. 
This organizational form for savings banks was created in 1985 by a 
law which allows for the issue of equity securities by banks that used to be 
nonprofits. This means they are entirely ownerless, since no stakeholder has 
a right to the residual cash flow (Hansmann, 1996). Thus, a savings bank is a 
hybrid between an ownerless company and a regular stock company. Except 
for the restricted voting right, the equity securities of savings banks carry the 
same ownership rights as equity securities of commercial banks.6
Like all Norwegian firms above a certain size, banks have a two-
tiered board structure. Except for charter amendments, which require a two 
thirds majority, all decisions in both tiers are made by simple majority. The 
supervisory board writes the corporate charter, hires and fires the CEO, sets 
the CEO salary, and appoints the executive board. 
 
7 The CEO has a vote on 
the executive board, but cannot be its chairman.8
The dividend is proposed by the executive board in either bank type. 
The final dividend decision in commercial banks is made by majority vote in 
the stockholder meeting. In savings banks,  the supervisory board makes the 
decision by majority vote among the four stakeholder types. The dividend 
proposed by the executive board can be reduced by these two bodies, but not 
increased.
 
9
The earnings of a savings bank is generated by both the 
stockholders’ equity and the ownerless equity. Hence, the earnings that 
belong to stockholders are total earnings multiplied by the stockholders’ 
share of total equity (i.e., their fractional cash flow right). To illustrate, 
suppose total earnings are 300, that stockholders own 40 % of the firm’s 
equity, and that dividends are 100. This implies that stockholders own 120 of 
 Dividends are paid once a year. No regulation mandates a 
minimum dividend, and the tax system is neutral regarding dividends and 
capital gains, both at the firm level and the investor level. 
                                                     
6 Stockholder-owned equity is senior to ownerless equity by construction. Hence, the 
equity claim is less risky in a savings bank than in a commercial bank. 
7  The supervisory board of commercial banks must have either 15, 30 or 45 
members. There is no such rule for savings banks. The executive board of 
commercial banks must have between 5 and 9 members. The minimum in savings 
banks is 4 members. 
8 The stockholder meeting of commercial banks elects 73 % of the supervisory board 
members, while the remaining 23 % is elected by the employees. The supervisory 
board of savings banks is elected by the employees, stockholders, customers and 
local politicians, who each choose 25 % of the members. See table 1. 
9 The supervisory board in either firm type normally states its dividend policy rather 
vaguely in the annual report, a common term being ”competitive dividend payout”. 
Nevertheless, some banks are quite specific, making statements like “we generally 
pay the earnings out as dividends rather than retain them”. 
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the earnings, and that 100 of it is paid out to them. Thus, the payout ratio is 
83 %. The remaining 20 of stockholders’ earnings is retained, as well as the 
180 (300-120) that is ownerless. This latter amount can never be paid out, as 
regulation prevents the stockholders from expropriating the ownerless 
equity. Thus, stockholders can be paid all the earnings they own, but not 
more (120 plus any retained stockholder earnings from earlier years in the 
example). The remainder must be retained, since nobody can claim it (180 
plus the ownerless earnings from earlier years). Hence, the controlling 
stakeholders of savings banks can use dividend policy to reduce the potential 
agency conflict with stockholders. The larger the fraction of stockholders’ 
earnings they pay, the less room there is for agency costs. 
Overall, this institutional environment implies that the controlling 
party in either organizational form has wide discretion over the dividend 
policy. In particular, any firm can choose to pay no dividend whatsoever. 
The maximum ratio of dividends to stockholders’ earnings for any sample 
firm is 100 % if the dividend is only paid out of stockholders’ earnings for 
the same year. The ratio is negative if retained stockholders’ earnings from 
earlier years are the only dividend source. It exceeds 100 % if the controlling 
party chooses to use all stockholders’ earnings for the year plus part of their 
past retained earnings. 
3.4 Descriptive statistics 
According to table 2, roughly 40 % of the 287 sample years come from 
commercial banks, which are more numerous than savings banks in the first 
half of the period and less in the second. The commercial bank sector is in 
the aggregate about twice as large as the savings bank sector. The average 
commercial bank is four times the size of the average savings bank. 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for risk, return, stock liquidity, 
and growth. Savings banks are less risky than commercial banks according 
to balance sheet proxies for total risk, but the difference as measured by 
systematic stock return risk is not statistically different from zero.10
                                                     
10 The risk figures based on the balance sheet are consistent with findings from the 
US that the bank’s total risk increases when more control rights are assigned to 
stockholders relative to depositors (Esty, 1997a; 1997b). 
 The two 
bank types have similar book returns on assets and market returns on equity. 
This may suggest that the two organizational forms have comparable 
economic efficiency. Savings banks have higher dividend yield, lower stock 
liquidity, and higher growth. The higher dividend yield in savings banks is a 
first sign of support for the substitution model. It reflects that although the 
stock return of the two firm types does not differ, the dividend component of 
the stock return is higher in the firm type with the weakest owner control and 
the highest growth. 
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Ownership characteristics are reported in table 4. The median equity 
holding of the largest owner is 10 % in commercial banks and 6 % in savings 
banks. This concentration, which is one third the typical level at the Oslo 
Stock Exchange, reflects a binding regulatory constraint. 11
The two organizational forms we described in table 1 reflect that the 
division of power between owners and non-owners is driven by bank type: 
Owners control the commercial bank, and non-owners control the savings 
bank. For given organizational form, however, there is also a second 
determinant of power sharing which stems from the difference between 
stockholders’ cash flow rights and control rights. We measure this wedge by 
the separation ratio, which we define as sep ≡ (c-v)/c. Here, c is the owners’ 
fraction of cash flow rights in the firm and v is their fraction of voting 
rights.
 Aggregate 
personal (i.e. direct) ownership is typically 20 % in commercial banks and 
52 % in savings bank. The latter figure is about three times higher than for 
the Oslo Stock Exchange as a whole (Bøhren & Ødegaard, 2006). 
12
Table 5 describes dividend policy by the payout propensity in panel 
A, by the payout ratio in panel B, and by the retention ratio in panel C. Panel 
A shows that most banks pay dividends, and that savings banks do so more 
often than commercial banks (89 % vs. 68 % of the time, respectively). 
Unlike commercial banks, most savings banks also pay dividends during the 
banking crisis in 1988-1992, when all banks experienced a series of negative 
earnings shocks.
 A sep of 0 means there is no separation, a positive sep means 
stockholders have less voting rights than cash flow rights, and a negative sep 
reflects the opposite. The separation ratio is 0.27 in all commercial banks, as 
stockholders always control 73 % of the votes for directors (v = 0.73) and 
hold all the cash flow rights (c = 1). In contrast, sep varies considerably 
across savings banks. Although their owners always hold 25 % of the voting 
rights, table 1 showed that their fraction of cash flow rights varies between 5 
% and 74 %. This heterogeneity produces a mean sep for savings banks of 
0.18, varying between -0.15 and +0.49. 
13
                                                     
11 The typical concentration is 30 % in Norway (Bøhren & Ødegaard, 2006) and 40 % 
in continental Europe (Barca & Becht, 2001). The mean exceeds the median for 
commercial banks in table 4 because the state held very large stakes in a few banks 
around the banking crisis in 1988-1992. The state owned 48 % of the equity in the 
largest commercial bank at the end of our sample period. 
 
12 No bank has multiple share classes, and we disregard potential ownership through 
pyramids. 
13 13 small and medium sized banks failed in 1988–1990, and large commercial 
banks started failing towards the end of 1990. As government support of distressed 
banks sometimes required the write-off of existing equity, the three largest 
commercial banks came under full state ownership in 1992. The industry regained 
profitability in 1993, and the state holdings were gradually reduced (Moe, Solheim, 
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The payout ratio in panel B is measured as cash dividends divided 
by stockholders’ earnings. The earnings component (i.e. the denominator) of 
the payout ratio in commercial banks is total earnings, since this belongs to 
the stockholders, since this is the part of total earnings that can potentially by 
expropriated from stockholders. In savings banks, however, the denominator 
of the payout ratio is only the part of earnings that is owned by the 
stockholders. This amount is always less than total earnings. 
Panel B only includes the subsample of dividend payers from panel 
A. It shows that banks in general distribute a high portion of earnings to their 
stockholders. Both the payout propensity and the payout ratio are unusually 
large by national standards.14 Although there is considerable variation from 
bank to bank, and particularly among the savings banks, the average payout 
ratio is significantly higher in savings banks than in commercial banks. This 
is true for the period as a whole, during the banking crisis years, and in eight 
of the fourteen sample years.  In fact, most savings banks pay out all the 
stockholders’ earnings as dividends. This means that practically the only 
stockholder asset withheld by savings banks is the cash that stockholders 
paid in at the equity offering. In contrast, a typical commercial bank 
withholds these proceeds plus roughly 55 % of the earnings.15
This aggregate dividend pattern supports the substitution model, 
since the strong non-owners in savings banks pay out more of stockholders’ 
earnings than the strong owners in commercial banks. Notice, however, that 
because savings banks are also financed by ownerless equity, to which no 
dividend can be paid, the high payout does not imply that only a small part 
of a savings bank’s total earnings is retained. Panel C documents that the 
average fraction of total earnings retained is 59 % in savings banks, which is 
not statistically different from the 52 % in commercial banks. According to 
the medians, the savings banks retain significantly more. Thus, the 
differential payout policy in the two organizational forms is not necessarily 
crucial for how retained equity can finance regulatory capital requirements 
and future growth. However, the difference does reflect how dividends may 
influence the seriousness of the conflict between owners and other 
stakeholders. 
 
                                                                                                                            
& Vale, 2004). By the end of our sample period, the state held a minority stake in 
the largest commercial bank and had sold their shares in the two others. 
14 The median payout propensity at the Oslo Stock Exchange is 47 % in the sample 
period, and the median payout ratio is 38 % for firms that pay dividends (Source: 
Oslo Stock Exchange). 
15 The mean and median payout ratios in savings banks sometimes exceed 100 %. 
This happens because dividends in year t can be paid both from year t earnings and 
from undistributed earnings generated before t. Since earnings vary over time, a 
policy of stable, high dividends per share may easily produce a payout ratio above 
100 % in a given year. This is more likely to happen in years when earnings are 
unusually low.  
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We argued in section 2 that the dividend policy of firms controlled 
by non-owners may be disciplined by several mechanisms, such as the need 
to raise new equity in the future. Moreover, table 3 showed that the growth 
rate is higher in savings banks than in commercial banks, which does suggest 
a higher financing need. More direct evidence based on the firms’ equity 
issues is provided in table 6. The table shows that although commercial 
banks go more often to the issue market than savings banks, both bank types 
expand their share capital by roughly the same proportion when issues occur. 
A typical savings bank sells new equity about every six years and increases 
its share capital (owned plus ownerless) by about 15 % on these occasions. 
Summarizing, the descriptive statistics has shown that the savings 
banks in our sample, which are controlled by non-owner stakeholders, have 
similar asset returns, stock returns, and systematic risk as commercial banks, 
which are owned and controlled by stockholders. Savings banks are smaller, 
have higher growth, more of their equity is held by personal owners, and 
they are as dependent on the equity issue market as commercial banks. 
Savings banks pay dividends more often and distribute more of 
stockholders’ earnings when they pay.      
3.5 Statistical tests 
We report the estimates from the base-case model in section 5.1, followed by 
a series of robustness tests in section 5.2. 
3.5.1 The base-case model 
We specify the base-case relationship between dividends and its potential 
determinants for firm i at time t as follows: 
 
1 2 1 3 4 5 6
(1)    Dividend Savings Dividend Leverage Liquidity Growth Sizeit i it it it it it itα β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +−
 
Dividend is cash dividends divided by stockholders’ earnings. Savings is a 
dummy variable which is 1 for a savings bank and zero for a commercial 
bank, Leverage is the book value of debt divided by the book value of assets, 
Liquidity is the value of traded equity divided by its market value, Growth is 
the relative increase in the book value of assets over the year, and Size is the 
log of the book value of assets. Flow variables are measured over the full 
year, and the other variables are measured at year-end. 
The key determinant in (1) is the savings bank dummy, and its 
coefficient β1 is predicted to be negative in the outcome model and positive 
in the substitution model. The remaining determinants, which are well-
known from the literature (Allen & Michaely, 2003; Kalay & Lemmon, 
2008), do not relate specifically to the first agency problem. Moreover, their 
relationship to dividends may at least initially be considered independent of 
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bank type. Thus, we leave potential interactions between organizational form 
and other dividend determinants to the robustness tests. 
(Lintner, 1956) was the first to document that most firms have much 
more stable dividends than earnings. We account for such dividend 
persistence by the lagged payout ratio and predict a positive β2. The 
expected sign of β3 for financial leverage is indeterminate from a corporate 
governance point of view. Both dividends and debt may be used to reduce 
the free cash flow, which means they may be both substitutes (negative β3) 
and complements (positive β3). More debt may also induce stronger conflicts 
between owners and creditors. Lower dividends may reduce this problem, 
implying a negative β3. Finally,  we expect a negative β3 from a regulatory 
perspective, as more debt brings the firm closer to the minimum capital 
coverage constraint. The closer it gets, the less dividends can be paid.16
We predict a negative β4 for stock liquidity, as an illiquid security 
makes it more costly for investors to undo the firm’s dividend policy by 
trading in the stock. The predicted sign of the growth coefficient β5 is 
indeterminate. The pecking order logic suggests that higher growth induces 
lower dividends, as retained earnings are the cheapest source of financing 
under asymmetric information. On the other hand, growing firms are more 
dependent on new equity than other firms. Therefore, they have stronger 
incentives to establish a good reputation in the stock market in order to 
reduce the cost of new equity. This may be particularly true when the owners 
are weak, such as the stockholders in savings banks. As we argued under the 
substitution model, paying consistently high dividends is a way to build 
reputation for not wasting free cash flow. High dividends is also a vehicle 
for exposing the firm to scrutiny in the market for new issues. In this 
context, growth may induce more dividends rather than less. Lacking a 
formal model of the equilibrium relationship between these two opposing 
forces, we leave β5 unspecified. Finally, since high dividends may be a way 
for small firms to reduce information asymmetry, we predict a negative β6. 
 
The base-case model (1) is estimated with OLS, pooled data, year 
dummies, and standard errors that are adjusted for clustering at the firm 
level. The year dummies control for unobservable, time-varying effects for 
the banking industry, which we assume have the same impact on dividend 
policy in both firm types. We cannot account for unobservable, firm-specific 
dividend determinants by fixed effects estimation, since we need a time-
invariant dummy to control for firm type. Although random effects 
estimation would allow for this, it cannot handle lagged dependent variables, 
which is necessary to capture dividend persistence (Hsiao, 2003). We 
                                                     
16 The minimum capital coverage as specified by regulation uses a weighting system 
for the asset classes. As we lack balance sheet data to implement this system, we use 
unweighted assets by setting the capital coverage ratio equal to the leverage ratio.  
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eliminate the effect of extreme outliers by winsorizing the 5 %/95 % tails of 
each variable except the dummies. Section 5.2 examines the robustness of 
the base-case estimates to these assumptions. 
We standardize every variable  except the bank type dummy by 
deducting the mean value of the variable from each observation and dividing 
the difference by the variable’s standard deviation. The coefficient estimate 
for the standardized variable has the same t-value as for the unstandardized 
variable, but expresses economic significance more directly. By having an 
expected value of zero and a standard deviation of one, its regression 
coefficient shows the number of standard deviations the payout ratio is 
expected to change if the dividend determinant changes by one standard 
deviation. Thus, the higher the absolute value of the standardized coefficient, 
the stronger the economic significance of the determinant. 
Table 7 shows that the estimates of the base-case model explains 62 
% of the variation in dividend payout.17
As expected, dividends are persistent (β2>0). Dividends do not 
respond systematically to changes in debt financing (β3), suggesting that 
closeness to capital coverage constraints is not an important concern when 
dividend decisions are made.
 The key result is that the estimated 
coefficient for the savings bank dummy (β1) is positive and statistically 
significant. This is consistent with the substitution model and refutes the 
outcome model. The relationship is also considerably stronger economically 
than for any other determinant. 
18 Neither is stock liquidity (β4), which means 
firms with lower stock liquidity do not pay higher dividends to offset their 
owners’ higher costs of transforming capital gains into cash or vice versa. 
Higher growth makes the firm pay more dividends (β5>0), which supports 
the reputation logic of the substitution model. Finally, small firms pay more 
dividends than large firms (β6<0). To the extent that larger size reflects 
better information transparency, this result supports the idea that dividends 
reduce the future cost of new equity.19
                                                     
17 The correlation matrix does not suggest serious multicollinearity problems. The 
only variables which correlate considerably are size and leverage, where the 
correlation coefficient is 0.57.  
 
18 As a robustness check, we alternatively classify subordinated debt as equity in the 
leverage ratio. We also test a version of (1) with a 0/1 dummy variable which is 1 if 
and only if leverage is close to the legal minimum, using alternative definitions of 
closeness. The results, which are available upon request, show that the findings 
based on (1) are robust to such alternative specifications of leverage. 
19 The estimates of the time dummy coefficients (not reported in table 7) show that 
the industry-wide dividends to earnings ratio is significantly lower in 1991-1993, 
which is towards the end of the banking crisis. We return to such fixed industry 
effects in section 5.2.  
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3.5.2 Robustness 
We first analyze whether the base-case results from model (1) are sensitive 
to using non-winsorized data and alternative econometric techniques. 
Second, we replace the classic dividend ratio used so far by three alternative 
measures proposed in the literature. Third, (1) is estimated without lagged 
dividends to check whether dividend persistence makes the bank type 
dummy act as a proxy for dividend growth rather than stakeholder control. 
Fourth, we analyze whether stakeholder control interacts with the 
relationship between dividends, size, and growth. Finally, we add more 
ownership characteristics to (1) than just organizational form.20
The first column of results in table 8 repeats the base-case results 
from table 7. According to the second column, including observations 
outside the 5 %/95 % bounds does not change our major result that firms pay 
more dividends when non-owner stakeholders are in control. No other 
determinant is statistically significant, however, and the model explains just 
9 % of variations in the payout ratio, compared to 62 % with winsorized 
data. Thus, including the outliers reduces the precision of the estimates. 
 
The third and fourth columns account for unobservable firm-specific 
effects by a random effects model. Since such a model cannot handle lagged 
dependent variables, the lagged payout ratio from (1) must be dropped. As is 
evident by comparing the fourth column to the second, replacing OLS by 
random effects estimation has no material effect in the non-winsorized data 
set beyond increasing the coefficient of determination from 9 % to 20 %. 
The third column shows that the combination of winsorized data and random 
effects estimation reproduces the base case results in the first column, except 
that liquidity becomes significant at the 10 % level and size becomes even 
more significant both statistically and economically. As already mentioned, 
however, the random effects model is problematic because it must ignore the 
lagged dependent variable, which is a highly significant determinant both in 
our OLS model and in tests reported in the literature. Thus, like in table 7, 
we estimate the models with pooled, winsorized data, fixed time effects, and 
cluster-adjusted standard errors in the following. 
The second robustness test analyzes the effect of using alternative 
payout measures. Table 9 summarizes the results. The first model is the 
base-case from table 7, the second adds stock repurchases to the regular cash 
dividend, whereas models three and four normalize these two alternative 
numerators by cash flow from operations rather than earnings. The table 
                                                     
20 We have also augmented the base-case model by ROA to check whether the 
relationship between the payout ratio and stakeholder conflicts depends on the 
firm’s overall return to capital invested. The estimates, which are available upon 
request, show that the base-case relationship between dividends and bank type 
remains unchanged. 
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documents that the main result is insensitive to whether we include stock 
repurchases in the payout or normalize payout by cash flow. The control 
variables tend to be more significant when we normalize by cash flow, and 
these two models explain more of the variation in dividend policy.  
We have found that dividends are persistent in every model, and that 
savings banks pay more dividends than commercial banks. This may imply, 
however, that the bank dummy in (1) does not reflect differences in dividend 
levels. Rather, it may reflect dividend growth, since the dividend level effect 
is already picked up by the lagged dividend term. In unreported regressions 
which are available upon request, we delete lagged dividends from the base-
case model. We find that the role of the bank dummy remains unchanged. As 
expected, the other determinants become more significant compared to the 
base-case model. 
The analysis so far suggests that, in addition to organizational form 
and last year’s dividend, the firm’s growth and size matter for the payout 
decision. In particular, dividends are larger in firms with high growth and 
low size, which supports the substitution model.  Our fourth robustness test 
explores whether this relationship differs across the two bank types. We 
analyze this in table 10 by interacting firm type with growth and size, 
respectively. According to the table, higher growth induces higher dividends,  
and this effect does not differ between the two bank types. For firm size, the 
tendency for smaller firms to pay higher dividends is only pronounced in the 
savings banks. Thus, firms controlled by non-owners seem to reduce size-
related information asymmetry costs by means of dividend policy.  
Corporate governance research argues theoretically and shows 
empirically that performance may improve when some owners have 
sufficiently strong incentives and power to monitor management (Becht, 
Bolton, & Röell, 2003). This suggests that certain properties of the 
ownership structure matter for the firm’s key decisions, such as dividend 
policy. The final robustness test considers how dividends relate to the firm’s 
ownership concentration and to the separation between cash flow rights and 
voting rights. We also control for dividend clientele effects by adding a 
dummy variable which is one if the largest stockholder is a person and zero 
otherwise.  
According to the outcome model, higher ownership concentration 
means higher dividend payout as a way of reducing the first agency problem. 
The substitution model predicts the opposite. We use the stake of the firm’s 
largest stockholder to measure ownership concentration. However, since 
ownership concentration is consistently low across the sample, it would be 
disturbing if this variable is significant in the regression. Indeed, such a 
result would question our rationale for ignoring the second agency problem 
in the first place and hence our argument for having made a particularly 
clean test. 
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Like in table 3, we measure separation by the ratio sep = (c-v)/c, 
where c is the owners’ fraction of cash flow rights in the firm and v is their 
fraction of voting rights. A higher sep means more separation and hence 
weaker stockholder control. Hence the predicted relationship between sep 
and dividends is negative under the outcome model and positive under the 
substitution model. This is the agency effect of separation on dividend 
payout. 
Due to peculiarities in our sample, however, sep also reflects the 
financing effect of separation on dividends. Because v is a constant 25 % in 
all savings banks, differences in sep across savings banks are exclusively 
due to differences in the owners’ fraction of residual cash flow rights, c. In 
particular, sep increases monotonically with c in the savings bank sample. 
This implies that the stronger the separation as measured by a high sep, the 
more dividends it takes to achieve a given payout ratio. To illustrate, 
suppose total earnings is 100 and that the firm chooses a payout ratio of 80 
%. This means it takes a dividend of 8 if stockholders own 10 % of the 
equity. If they own 70 %, however, the required dividend for a 80 % payout 
is 56 rather than just 8. Thus, for a fixed payout ratio, the drain on retained 
earnings increases proportionally as sep grows. Due to the cost of raising 
new equity (Myers and Majluf, 1984), the drainage effect on retained 
earnings dictates a negative relationship between sep and dividends. Overall, 
this means that under the outcome model, both the agency effect and the 
financing effect imply a negative relationship between sep and dividends. 
Under the substitution model, the relationship is positive if the agency effect 
dominates and negative if the financing effect is the stronger. 
Table 11 reports the results across the four alternative payout 
measures. Four features emerge. First, the role of  the savings bank dummy 
is unchanged. Second, and reassuringly, ownership concentration is not a 
significant determinant of payout. Third, the relationship between separation 
and dividends is negative and significant. Considering the consistent 
findings in favor of the substitution model so far, we interpret this as 
evidence that the financing effect of separation dominates the agency effect. 
Finally, the positive relationship between dividends and personal ownership 
under two of the payout measures supports the clientele argument that the 
mix of stockholder types in the firm influences its dividend decision. 
Summarizing, we have shown that after having accounted for 
differences in past dividends, financial leverage, stock liquidity, firm growth, 
firm size, and unobservable firm and industry effects, dividends are 
significantly higher both statistically and economically in firms controlled by 
non-owner stakeholders than in firms controlled by owners. The robustness 
tests document that this result survives under alternative data sets, dividend 
payout measures, and when we control for ownership structure differences, 
for interaction effects, for the separation between ownership and control, and 
for unobservable firm characteristics. Also, more of stockholders’ earnings 
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are paid out when the firm is small and when it grows fast. Overall, this 
evidence, which is based on the full population rather than a sample, is 
consistent with the substitution model and inconsistent with the outcome 
model. 
(Szilagyi & Renneboog, 2007) make the opposite conclusion in 
favor of the outcome model, arguing that their findings from the Netherlands 
could be extended to other stakeholder-oriented governance regimes. Our 
sample firms do operate in a more extreme stakeholder-oriented regime, as 
non-owner stakeholders have voting majority in one of the two 
organizational forms. Nevertheless, we find strong support for the 
substitution model. We suspect their conclusion is driven by the inability to 
distinguish between the two agency problems in the test, which is a 
challenge in most existing studies. 
Notable exceptions to this ambiguity problem are (Faccio, Lang, & 
Young, 2001) and (John & Knyazeva, 2006). Their findings are in line with 
ours, as they both report evidence in favour of the substitution model in 
samples involving regular stock companies, only.  In particular, (Faccio, 
Lang, & Young, 2001) find that dividends in corporate pyramids are higher 
the stronger the control chain through the pyramid, and the larger the 
difference between the controlling block’s voting rights and cash flows 
rights in firms with strong control chains. Since the second agency problem 
is the dominating one in such firms, their findings support the substitution 
hypothesis. (John & Knyazeva, 2006) relate dividends to overall governance 
quality rather than just one of its components, such as ownership structure. 
They find support for the substitution model under both agency problems, as 
dividends increase with decreasing governance quality. 
3.6 Conclusions 
Conflicts of interest between the firm’s stakeholders may reduce the creation 
of wealth for the firm’s stakeholders as a group. This paper analyzes whether 
dividend policy plays a role in this context by influencing the level of 
potential conflict between the stakeholders. We use an approach which 
avoids the inherent identification problem in most earlier tests of the 
outcome model and the substitution model, which are the two competing 
theories of how stakeholder conflicts and dividend policy interact. This is 
ensured by only studying firms where the agency conflict between large 
owners and small owners can be ignored because regulation mandates low 
ownership concentration in all firms. In contrast, potential conflicts between 
owners and non-owners vary more than usual. Moreover, this cross-sectional 
variation does not happen because ownership concentration varies from firm 
to firm, which is why existing research has produced ambiguous results. 
Rather, the variation occurs because firm control belongs to the owners in 
one organizational form and to non-owner stakeholders in the other. These 
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two parties may have opposing views on the firm’s optimal dividend policy. 
This sample property is our key to a cleaner test of how stakeholder conflicts 
influence the firm’s dividend policy. 
Our major finding is that firms controlled by non-owner stakeholders 
pay out significantly more dividends than comparable firms controlled by 
owners. This evidence, which is robust to alternative model specifications 
and econometric techniques, is consistent with the substitution model and 
inconsistent with the outcome model. It suggests that dividends are used to 
mitigate agency conflicts rather than to intensify them. The potential agency 
conflict is high, but the actual conflict is made smaller by the dividend 
payout. This inference is supported by indirect evidence which may reflect 
that the strong non-owner stakeholders use dividend policy to build a good 
reputation with the weak owners. 
  
66 
 
Figure 1: The predicted relationship between ownership concentration and 
dividend payout under the first and the second agency problem 
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Figure 2: The predicted relationship between owner control and dividend 
payout in our sample 
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Table 1: Firm types, control rights, and cash flow rights 
Stockholders' 
Firm type Stockholders Employees Depositors Community cash flow rights, %
Commercial banks 73 27 0 0 100
Savings banks 25 25 25 25  5 - 74
This table shows the distribution of stakholders' control rights and stockholders' residual cash flow
rights in the two firm types (commercial banks and savings banks) in our sample. The cash flow rights in
a savings bank that do not belong to the stockholders are ownerless.
Stakeholders' control rights, %
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Table 2: Sample size, aggregate size per firm type, and size per firm 
Year All Mean Median Mean Median
1989 16 13 3 403.29 12.42 31.02 7.76 4.14 2.13
1990 13 10 3 430.83 12.54 43.08 9.35 4.18 2.18
1991 12 8 4 258.55 83.08 32.32 9.26 20.77 5.39
1992 14 10 4 265.61 83.73 26.56 7.33 20.93 5.18
1993 14 10 4 352.46 88.34 35.25 8.62 22.08 5.90
1994 17 9 8 350.29 148.27 38.92 11.29 18.53 12.54
1995 21 9 12 386.27 184.13 42.92 22.01 15.34 7.86
1996 21 8 13 444.44 212.46 55.55 19.13 16.34 5.88
1997 23 9 14 516.93 244.87 57.44 16.95 17.49 5.42
1998 28 9 19 546.59 285.69 60.73 18.32 15.04 3.74
1999 26 6 20 577.18 356.22 96.20 24.53 17.81 4.30
2000 28 6 22 638.83 413.74 106.47 26.80 18.81 4.86
2001 27 5 22 425.68 460.03 85.14 28.23 20.91 5.19
2002 27 6 21 709.10 263.52 118.18 32.47 12.55 5.52
Sum 287 118 169 6306.06 2849.05 829.78 242.03 224.93 76.09
Mean 21 8 12 450.43 203.50 59.27 17.29 16.07 5.44
Median 21 9 13 428.25 198.29 49.32 12.77 17.65 5.03
St.dev. 6 2 8 133.04 142.50 31.72 8.54 86.29 2.53
This table shows the total number of firms in the sample (All), the number of firms per type
(commercial banks and savings banks), the aggregate size per firm type, and the mean and median
size per individual firm of each type. We measure size as total assets in billion NOK as of year 2002.
The sample is all commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year-
end.
Commercial 
banks
Savings 
banks
Commercial 
banks
Savings 
banks
banks banks
Commercial Savings
Number of firms Aggregate size  Size per firm
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics for risk, return, liquidity, and growth 
Characteristic Mean Std Median Mean Std Median Mean (t) Median (z) 
Risk
Asset risk, % 14.39 5.83 13.45 8.40 2.88 7.81 6.00 (12.12) 5.63 (11.81)
Liability risk, % 54.75 24.07 48.96 33.77 12.48 33.74 20.98 (10.99) 15.22 (9.17)
Leverage, % 94.29 2.92 94.40 91.79 3.15 92.85 2.50 (6.92) 1.55 (6.78)
Earnings risk, % 1.69 1.91 1.34 0.48 0.40 0.42 1.21 (2.64) 0.92 (1.96)
Systematic risk 0.78 0.39 0.74 0.89 0.46 0.89 -0.11 (-0.92) -0.15 (-0.83)
Return
ROA, % 0.42 0.85 0.78 0.45 0.76 0.75 0.02 (-0.09) -0.30 (0.37)
Stock returns, % 20.44 73.76 9.04 14.83 38.47 9.67 5.61 (0.72) -0.63 (-0.04)
Capital gain, % 15.74 73.57 5.51 6.66 39.27 -0.40 9.07 (1.19) 5.92 (0.87)
Dividend yield, % 4.70 4.69 5.03 8.18 2.63 8.46 -3.48 (-7.52) -3.43 (-8.43)
Liquidity 
Turnover, % 60.18 66.32 40.01 27.01 25.13 17.28 33.17 (6.16) 22.73 (5.10)
Growth
Asset growth, % 9.92 21.73 7.91 13.71 9.45 12.39 -3.79 (-1.94) -4.48 (-3.52)
Tobin's Q 1.01 0.43 1.00 1.21 0.29 1.17 -0.20 (-4.77) -0.18 (-5.94)
Commercial banks Savings banks Difference
The table shows the mean value, the standard deviation (std), and the median value for proxies of
risk, return, liquidity, and growth. We measure Asset risk as the percentage of assets which is not
cash, claims on the central bank, amortizable loans, or fixed assets. Liability risk is the percentage
of liabilities which is not deposits, Leverage is total debt as a percentage of total seets, while
Earnings risk is the standard deviation of ROA (net income over total assets). Systematic risk is
the stock's beta estimated over the sample period from monthly stock returns. Stock return is
capital gains plus dividend yield, and Turnover is the value of the trade in the stock during the
year in percent of its market value at year-end. Asset growth is the relative increase in total assets
over the year, and Tobin's Q is measured as the market value of stock divided by its book value.
The means and medians are equally-weighted across firms and years. The sample is all commercial 
banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year-end at least once over the
period 1989-2002.
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Table 4: Ownership structure 
Characteristic Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t) Median (z)
Largest owner, % 15.99 10.00 6.98 6.00 9.01 (7.46) 4.00 (8.94)
Five largest owners, % 37.61 32.00 18.06 17.00 19.55 (12.84) 15.00 (10.53)
Personal owners, % 21.66 20.00 50.56 52.00 -28.89 (-11.62) -32.00 (-9.34)
Separation 0.27 0.27 0.18 0.38 0.09 (1.75) -0.11 (-2.57)
The table shows ownership characteristics across the two firm types (savings banks and commercial
banks). We report the percentage equity holding of the firm's largest owner, the aggregate percentage
holding of the five largest owners, and the aggregate percentage holding in the firm by personal owners
(individuals). Separation reflects the wedge between the stockholders' cash flow rights and control
rights. We operationalize Separation as the difference between the stockholders' contractual fraction of
cash flow rights and their contractual fraction of board seats, divided by the stockholders' fraction of
cash flow rights. The sample is all commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock
Exchange by year-end at least once over the period 1989-2002. Data source: Verdipapirsentralen ASA.
Commercial banks Savings banks Difference
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Table 5: Dividend characteristics 
Year All
1989 56.25
1990 38.46
1991 16.67
1992 14.29
1993 57.14
1994 88.24
1995 95.24
1996 95.24
1997 95.65
1998 100.00
1999 100.00
2000 100.00
2001 96.30
2002 88.89
Mean 74.45
Median 92.06
St.dev. 31.66
All
Year Mean Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t) Median (z)
1989 83.53 60.04 51.47 130.50 125.70 -70.46 (-4.89) -74.23 (-2.32)
1990 121.39 89.68 89.68 142.53 138.45 -52.85 (-2.66) -48.77 (-1.73)
1991 147.25 n.a. n.a. 147.25 147.25 n.a. (n.a.) n.a. (n.a.)
1992 27.97 6.82 0.07 49.12 49.12 -42.31 (n.a.) -49.05 (-1.00)
1993 53.41 25.66 0.27 81.17 69.83 -55.51 (-2.80) -69.56 (-2.31)
1994 62.33 50.32 42.99 76.05 80.74 -25.73 (-1.60) -37.74 (-2.08)
1995 62.68 53.94 45.81 69.04 57.99 -15.11 (-1.13) -12.17 (-1.25)
1996 75.11 44.71 41.49 91.49 99.15 -46.78 (-4.95) -57.67 (-3.13)
1997 75.92 45.63 44.35 93.23 103.13 -47.60 (-4.91) -58.77 (-3.41)
1998 106.14 47.78 47.76 133.78 96.36 -86.00 (-1.46) -48.60 (-3.57)
1999 79.69 46.87 51.14 89.41 96.66 -42.54 (-4.38) -45.52 (-2.85)
2000 78.56 36.37 35.16 89.32 98.90 -52.95 (-5.74) -63.74 (-3.06)
2001 89.49 38.46 40.58 101.32 102.97 -62.87 (-6.11) -62.39 (-3.11)
2002 129.90 45.94 50.00 145.02 104.76 -99.09 (-0.66) -54.76 (-2.47)
All 84.71 47.38 44.72 103.73 102.18 -56.35 (-4.40) -57.46 (-9.98)
St.dev. 98.72 25.65 114.73
All
Year Mean Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t) Median (z)
1989 40.84 39.96 48.53 42.60 49.65 -2.64 (-0.18) -1.12 (-0.05)
1990 25.36 10.32 10.32 35.38 44.20 -25.07 (-1.37) -33.88 (-0.58)
1991 20.25 20.25 20.25 -20.25 (n.a.) -20.25 (n.a.)
1992 86.62 93.18 93.18 80.06 80.06 13.12 (n.a.) 13.12 (1.00)
1993 65.92 74.34 73.30 57.51 71.30 16.83 (1.04) 1.99 (0.58)
1994 55.78 49.68 57.01 62.75 64.27 -13.07 (-0.90) -7.26 (-0.81)
1995 58.05 46.06 54.19 67.85 66.77 -21.79 (-2.12) -12.59 (-1.79)
1996 60.51 55.29 58.51 63.31 58.98 -8.02 (-1.14) -0.46 (-0.59)
1997 59.04 54.37 55.65 61.71 58.27 -7.34 (-0.98) -2.62 (-0.55)
1998 48.68 52.22 52.24 47.00 59.73 5.21 0.20 -7.49 (-1.4)
1999 64.77 53.13 48.86 67.68 68.04 -14.54 (-2.12) -19.19 (-1.56)
2000 69.28 63.63 64.84 70.30 68.70 -6.67 (-1.02) -3.86 (-0.92)
2001 67.12 61.54 59.42 68.18 65.40 -6.63 (-0.92) -5.98 (-0.96)
2002 35.69 54.06 50.00 32.79 66.27 21.27 (0.27) -16.27 (-0.82)
All 56.62 52.41 54.64 58.52 65.38 -6.11 (-0.89) -3.18 (-3.18)
91.67
87.5088.89
100.00
87.50 100.00
100.00
100.00
25.00
50.00
100.00
A. Payout propensity
40.00
Commercial banks
0.00
Savings banks
46.15
20.00
10.00
100.00
88.89
100.00
100.00
88.19
100.00
100.00
88.92
95.24
95.45
100.00
100.00
66.67
67.72
100.00
100.00
37.13
This table shows the percentage of firms in the sample that pay cash dividends (panel A), the payout ratio 
for dividend payers (panel B), and the retention ratio of payers (panel C). The payout ratio is cash
dividends divided by the earnings that belong to stockholders. The retention ratio is the fraction of total
earnings not paid out as dividends to stockholders. All ratios are percentages. The sample is all
commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year-end.
C. Retention ratio for dividend payers
B. Payout ratio for dividend payers
Commercial banks Savings banks
Savings banksCommercial banks
Difference
Difference
22.66
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Table 6: Equity issue activity 
Commercial Savings
Year banks banks
1989 46.15 66.67
1990 50.00 33.33
1991 37.50 50.00
1992 30.00 25.00
1993 40.00 50.00
1994 22.22 37.50
1995 11.11 8.33
1996 12.50 15.38
1997 11.11 21.43
1998 55.56 10.53
1999 33.33 10.00
2000 33.33 13.64
2001 40.00 13.64
2002 33.33 14.29
Mean 31.30 17.75
Median 33.33 18.41
St. dev. 14.12 18.34
Year Mean Median Mean Median Mean (t) Median (z)
1989 55.87 26.41 33.61 33.61 22.26 (0.37) -7.20 (-0.33)
1990 5.75 3.18 2.07 2.07 3.68 (n.a.) 1.11 (0.88)
1991 38.82 40.93 17.72 17.72 21.10 (0.82) 23.22 (1.16)
1992 332.34 64.02 17.49 17.49 314.85 (n.a.) 46.52 (0.45)
1993 35.91 31.47 19.41 19.41 16.49 (0.94) 12.05 (0.93)
1994 12.84 12.84 36.49 24.78 -23.65 (-1.16) -11.95 (-1.73)
1995 10.43 10.43 42.28 42.28 -31.85 (n.a.) -31.85 (-1.00)
1996 0.68 0.68 7.35 7.35 -6.67 (n.a.) -6.67 (n.a.)
1997 0.54 0.54 21.45 20.40 -20.91 (n.a.) -19.86 (-1.34)
1998 18.14 13.84 19.57 19.57 -1.42 (-0.12) -5.73 (-0.39)
1999 10.18 10.18 6.27 6.27 3.90 (n.a.) 3.90 (n.a.)
2000 16.97 16.97 0.59 0.52 16.38 (1.33) 16.45 (n.a.)
2001 4.58 4.58 5.72 0.31 -1.14 (-0.15) 4.27 (0.58)
2002 9.15 9.15 5.36 0.44 3.79 (0.42) 8.71 (1.16)
Mean 45.81 13.67 15.95 15.95 29.86 (1.15) -2.28 (-0.68)
Difference
This table describes the firms' equity issuing behavior. Panel A shows the
percentage of banks issuing new equity, and panel B shows new share capital as a
percentage of existing share capital (owned plus ownerless share capital in savings
banks) for issuing firms. The sample is all commercial banks and savings banks
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year-end.
Commercial banks Savings banks
B. Issue volume
A. Issue propensity
74 
 
Table 7: Estimates of the base-case model 
Characteristic Hypothesis Coefficient
Savings bank dummy O: - ; S: + 0.793***
(3.34)
Lagged payout + 0.302*
(1.72)
Leverage ? -0.040
(-0.69)
Liquidity - 0.090
(1.47)
Growth ? 0.124**
(2.08)
Size - -0.142*
(-1.73)
Constant -1.623***
(-2.82)
Sample size 211
R2 adjusted 0.62
F-ratio 19.06***
This table relates a bank's dividend payments to potential
determinants. The dependent variable is cash dividends divided by
stockholders' earnings. Savings bank dummy equals one if the bank
is a savings bank and zero otherwise. Lagged payout is the
dependent variable one period earlier. Leverage is total debt over
total assets, and Liquidity is the market value of the trade in the
stock over the year divided by its market value at year-end. We
measure Growth as the relative increase in assets over the year, while
Size is the log of total assets in NOK1000. In the Hypothesis column,
O refers to the Outcome model, S is the Substitution model, and the
signs reflect the predicted relationship between dividends and the
independent variable in question. The model is estimated on the
pooled sample with year dummies (not reported), and we use
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. Non-dummy
data are winsorized at the 5% and 95% tails. We standardize every
non-dummy variable by deducting the mean value of the variable
from each observation and dividing the difference by the variable's
standard deviation. The t-values are shown in parentheses, and
statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are
labelled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all commercial
banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year-
end at least once over the period 1989-2002. 
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Table 8: The base-case model with non-winsorized data and random effects 
Characteristic Base case  Non-winsorized data Winsorized data Non-winsorized data
Savings bank dummy 0.793*** 0.694*** 1.163*** 0.669***
(3.34) (3.79) (9.00) (4.31)
Lagged payout 0.302* 0.053
(1.72) (0.68)
Leverage -0.04 -0.019 0.039 -0.01
(-0.69) (-0.62) (0.57) (-0.12)
Liquidity 0.09 0.071 0.098* 0.076
(1.47) (1.48) (1.85) (1.02)
Growth 0.124** -0.26 0.145** -0.102
(2.08) (-0.70) (2.43) (-0.37)
Size -0.142* -0.045 -0.236*** -0.057
(-1.73) (-0.42) (-3.40) (-0.71)
Constant -1.623*** -0.829** -0.951*** -0.415
(-2.82) (-2.62) (-3.20) (-0.85)
Sample size 211 211 259 259
R2 adjusted 0.62 0.09 0.65 0.20
F-ratio 19.06*** 2.13*** 297.18*** 59.32***
Pooled estimation Random effects estimation
This table compares the use of non-winsorized data and random effects estimation to the
base-case approach from table 7, which uses pooled data winsorized at 5%/95%. The
dependent variable is cash dividends over stockholders' earnings. Savings bank dummy
equals one if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise. Lagged payout is the
dependent variable one period earlier. Leverage is total debt over total assets, and Liquidity
is the market value of the trade in the stock over the year divided by its market value at year-
end. We measure Growth as the relative increase in assets over the year, while Size is the log
of total assets in NOK1000. and we use standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm
level. Non-dummy data are winsorized at the 5% and 95% tails. We standardize every non-
dummy variable by deducting the mean value of the variable from each observation and
dividing the difference by the variable's standard deviation. Every model is estimated with
year dummies (unreported), and the pooled estimation uses standard errors adjusted for
clustering at the firm level. The t-values are shown in parentheses, and statistically
significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as *, **, and ***,
respectively. The sample is all commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock
Exchange by year-end at least once over the period 1989-2002.
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Table 9: Alternative dividend payout measures 
Div/ (Div+Rep)/ Div/ (Div+Rep)/
Characteristic E E CF CF
Savings bank dummy 0.793*** 0.784*** 0.501*** 0.507***
(3.34) (3.34) (3.90) (4.00)
Lagged payout 0.302* 0.310* 0.458*** 0.458***
(1.72) (1.75) (4.82) (4.83)
Leverage -0.04 -0.066 -0.156*** -0.165***
(-0.69) (-1.10) (-3.47) (-3.69)
Liquidity 0.09 0.09 0.109* 0.110*
(1.47) (1.49) (1.83) (1.85)
Growth 0.124** 0.125** 0.173** 0.171**
(2.08) (2.13) (2.68) (2.63)
Size -0.142* -0.123 -0.095* -0.088
(-1.73) (-1.49) (-1.77) (-1.64)
Constant 0.796 1.08 3.185*** 3.327***
(0.99) (1.29) (3.48) (3.63)
Sample size 211 211 211 211
R2 adjusted 0.62 0.63 0.72 0.72
F-ratio 19.06*** 19.55*** 29.75*** 29.87***
Payout measure
This table reports the effect of estimating the base-case model with alternative
dividend payout measures, which are (i) cash dividends (Div) over earnings (E),
(ii) cash dividends and repurchases (Rep) over earnings, (iii) cash dividends over
cash flow from operations (CF), and (iv) cash dividends and repurcases over
cash flow from operations. The denominater in the payout ratio reflects only the
earnings or cash flow that belongs to the stockholders. Savings bank dummy
equals one if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise. Lagged payout is
the dependent variable one period earlier, Leverage is total debt over total assets,
and Liquidity is the market value of the trade over the year divided by the market
value of the stock at year-end. We measure Growth as the relative increase in
assets over the year, while Size is the log of total assets in NOK1000.  
We standardize every non-dummy variable by deducting the mean value of the
variable from each observation and dividing the difference by the variable's
standard deviation. Non-dummy data are winsorized at 5% and 95%. The models
are estimated on the pooled sample with year dummies (not reported), and we use
standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The t-values are shown
in parentheses, and statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level are labelled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all commercial
banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year-end at least
once over the period 1989-2002.
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Table 10: Interacting stakeholder control with growth and size 
Characteristic Coefficient
Savings bank dummy 0.989***
(4.38)
Lagged payout 0.199
(1.12)
Leverage -0.011
(-0.17)
Liquidity 0.098*
(1.85)
Growth 0.158*
(1.72)
Size 0.014
(0.22)
Growth * Savings bank dummy -0.142
(-1.46)
Size * Savings bank dummy -0.342**
(-2.72)
Constant -1.842***
(-2.82)
Sample size 211
R2 adjusted 0.65
F-ratio 19.96
This table expands the base-case model from table 7 by interacting
stakeholder control with the firm's growth and size. The dependent variable is
cash dividends divided by stockholders' earnings. Savings bank dummy
equals one if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise. Lagged payout is
the dependent variable one period earlier. Leverage is total debt over total
assets, and Liquidity is the market value of the trade in the stock over the year
divided by its market value at year-end. We measure Growth as the relative
increase in assets over the year, while Size is the log of total assets in
NOK1000. We include two interaction terms where we multiply the savings
bank dummy with the growth variable and the size variable, respectively. We
standardize every non-dummy variable by deducting the mean value of the
variable from each observation and dividing the difference by the variable's
standard deviation. Non-dummy data are winsorized at 5% and 95%. The
models are estimated on the pooled sample with year dummies (not reported),
and we use standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The t-
values are shown in parentheses, and statistically significant relationships at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The
sample is all commercial banks and savings banks listed on the Oslo Stock
Exchange by year-end at least once over the period 1989-2002. 
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Table 11: Accounting for ownership structure characteristics 
Div/ (Div+Rep)/ Div/ (Div+Rep)/
Characteristic Hypothesis E E CF CF
Savings bank dummy O: - ; S: + 0.902*** 0.893*** 0.818*** 0.819***
(3.34) (3.33) (3.84) (3.88)
Largest holding O: - ; S: + 0.017 0.022 -0.09 -0.087
(0.21) (0.28) (-1.30) (-1.25)
Separation O: - ; S: ? -0.345*** -0.376*** -0.346*** -0.354***
(-2.78) (-3.05) (-3.20) (-3.30)
Largest is person + 0.097** 0.098** 0.023 0.023
(2.26) (2.25) (0.64) (0.64)
Lagged payout + 0.224 0.224 0.382*** 0.380***
(1.20) (1.21) (3.51) (3.48)
Leverage ? -0.013 -0.039 -0.088 -0.099
(-0.18) (-0.55) (-1.40) (-1.63)
Liquidity - 0.087 0.087 0.097 0.098
(1.37) (1.37) (1.42) (1.43)
Growth ? 0.033 0.032 0.075 0.073
(0.54) (0.52) (1.42) (1.36)
Size - -0.115 -0.094 -0.087 -0.079
(-1.34) (-1.12) (-1.62) (-1.50)
Constant -0.29 -1.785*** -0.656 -0.657
(-0.42) (3.23) (-0.97) (-0.98)
Sample size 202 202 202 202
R2 adjusted 0.63 0.64 0.72 0.72
F-ratio 133.87*** 133.51*** 228.08*** 275.05***
This table expands the models from table 9 by variables that account for ownership concentration,
direct (personal) ownership, and for the separation between ownership and control, respectively.
The alternative dependent variables are (i) dividends (Div) over earnings (E), (ii) dividends and
repurchases (Rep) over earnings, (iii) dividends over cash flow from operations (CF), and (iv)
dividends and repurcases over cash flow from operations. The denominators of these payout
ratios only reflect the earnings or cash flow that belongs to the stockholders. Savings bank dummy 
equals one if the bank is a savings bank and zero otherwise. Largest holding is the ownership
fraction of the largest owner, and Separation is aggreagte cash flow rights in the firm minus
aggregate voting rights divided by aggregate cash flow rights. Largest is person is a dummy
variable which is 1 if the largest owner is a person and zero otherwise. Leverage is total debt over
total assets, Liquidity is the market value of the trade in the stock over the year divided by its
market value at year-end. We measure Growth as the relative increase in assets over the year, while
Size is the log of total assets in NOK1000. In the Hypothesis column, O refers to the Outcome
model, S is the Substitution model, and the signs reflect the predicted relationship between
dividends and the independent variable in question. 
We standardize every non-dummy variable by deducting the mean value of the variable from each
observation and dividing the difference by the variable's standard deviation. Non-dummy data are
winsorized at 5% and 95%. The models are estimated on the pooled sample with year dummies (not
reported), and we use standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level. The t-values are
shown in parentheses, and statistically significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are
labelled as *, **, and ***, respectively. The sample is all commercial banks and savings banks
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange by year-end at least once over the period 1989-2002. 
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4 Ownership and the decision to go public1
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
This paper investigates what motivates ﬁrms to go public. Using the 
population of all Norwegian non-listed ﬁrms from 2000 to 2008, we 
document that the going public decision is influenced by the ownership 
structure of the firm prior to the listing date. Firms with more dispersed 
owners and firms with more institutional ownership are more likely to go 
public. These findings suggest that controlling owners use their power to 
avoid going public. Possibly to continue consuming control benefits. 
 
JEL classiﬁcation: G32, G34 
 
Keywords: Initial Public Offering, Corporate Governance, Private Firms, 
Control Benefits 
  
                                                     
1I would like to thank Øyvind Bøhren, Øyvind Norli and seminar participants at the 
Norwegian School of Management (BI) for helpful comments. I am grateful to the 
Center for Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at BI for providing support for 
this project. 
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4.1 Introduction 
The going public decision involves a choice by current owners to give up 
some or all of the control beneﬁts they had while the company was private. 
The Initial Public Oﬀering (IPO) is usually a large equity oﬀering that, due 
to the listing requirements of the stock exchange, is sold to many outside 
investors. This transaction dilutes the ownership of pre-IPO owners. In 
addition, post IPO, the ﬁrm’s management is being monitored by both new 
owners and new potential investors. The public ﬁrm is also exposed to 
scrutiny by regulators, analysts, and the stock exchange it lists on. Thus, the 
loss of control beneﬁts happens both directly through dilution and indirectly 
through increased monitoring. This paper investigates empirically how the 
ownership structure influence the decision to go public. 
The main challenge in an empirical study of the going public 
decision is lack of detailed data on private ﬁrms. It is obviously problematic 
that one does not observe historical accounting information, ownership 
structure, and other characteristics for IPO ﬁrms prior to the listing date. 
However, it is equally limiting not to observe the ﬁrms that decide to stay 
private. To understand why firms go public, one should study both firms that 
choose to go public and firms that choose to stay private. The main 
contribution of this paper is to analyze the determinants of the IPO decision 
using data where this type of information is available for a very large sample 
of private ﬁrms over an extensive time period. 
We use accounting information for the population of Norwegian 
limited liability ﬁrms over a sample period starting in 2000 and ending in 
2008. During this period there is a total of 319,038 unique ﬁrms in the 
data—of which more than 99 per cent are non-listed. Although many of 
these ﬁrms do not have the option to become listed, a large number will enter 
our sample of listing candidates. In addition to the scope of information on 
private ﬁrms, our data has several advantages when compared to data used in 
other studies. First, private and public Norwegian companies are required by 
law to ﬁle audited annual statements. Hence the data quality is unusually 
high.2
                                                     
2 A failure to submit audited statements causes liquidation. This process normally 
takes less than 17 months. 
 Second, the accounting data is augmented by detailed information on 
ownership structure for all firms. Third, we observe the population of private 
ﬁrms. Hence we do not have to worry about the endogeneity question of why 
a firm is included in the dataset in the first place. In related studies, the 
private ﬁrms are observed for a particular reason. For example, (Pagano, 
Panetta, & Zingales, 1998) rely on data on ﬁrms that have a relationship with 
particular banks. (Boehmer & Ljungqvist, 2004) look at ﬁrms with publicly 
traded debt. In contrast, our data allow us to perform a detailed investigation 
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of ﬁrms that decide to go public as well as of ﬁrms that decide to stay 
private, independently of the firm’s specific setting.  
Our main and novel ﬁnding is that the going public decision is 
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the ownership structure of the ﬁrm prior to the 
listing date. Firms with more institutional investors and ﬁrms that have more 
dispersed ownership are more likely to do an IPO. This is consistent with the 
notion that controlling owners keep the firm private to retain their control 
benefits. Moreover, the probability of going public decreases with the age 
and increases with the size and leverage of the firm. This finding is 
consistent with the idea that firms do IPOs to access capital markets. 
These results are important because they shed new light on the 
relevance of corporate governance in the IPO decision. At the hart of 
corporate governance stands the separation of ownership and control. The 
agency problems created by this separation are extensively studied in 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and the voluminous literature that followed this 
seminal paper. Compared with the amount of research that has been done on 
understanding the eﬀects of separating ownership from control, much less 
research asks why or why not such a separation happens in the ﬁrst place. 
Our paper contributes to this literature by showing how the IPO decision is 
influenced by the costs and benefits of separating ownership from control. 
One reason this governance question has received less attention in 
the literature is that it has been viewed as an inherent feature of the life-cycle 
of a ﬁrm: When a ﬁrm grows, it becomes too complex to be run by a single 
owner-manager. Moreover, increased demand for capital leaves the owner-
manager unable to provide suﬃcient funding when the firm reaches a certain 
size. Consequently, the ﬁrm is taken over by a team of professional 
managers and funded through capital markets. 
Although this is an accurate description of what happens in many 
ﬁrms, it is still not a satisfactory explanation for all firms. First, there are 
many large ﬁrms where ownership and control are not separated. Second, the 
typical degree of separation varies dramatically between countries. 
The latter observation has motivated a number of researchers to 
investigate why companies typically have dispersed ownership and 
professional managers in some countries, but are closely-held with family-
based management in others. (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1997) ﬁnd that countries with weaker investor protection have less 
developed capital markets. One interpretation of this ﬁnding is that investors 
are willing to provide funding for corporations if they are protected against 
the consumption of control beneﬁts by managers and controlling 
shareholders. This view is supported by (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999) and (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). The latter paper documents 
that control beneﬁts are indeed higher in countries with less developed 
capital markets and weaker investor protection. 
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The international evidence suggests that controlling owners are 
either unable or unwilling to relinquish control to professional managers or 
co-investors if the control beneﬁts are large. Rather than investigating the 
issue at the aggregate level, this paper investigates it at the ﬁrm level and 
relates it specifically to the IPO decision. 
Our findings suggest that controlling owners that may consume 
control benefits are reluctant to take the firm public. In contrast, institutional 
owners are more likely to take the firm public. A possible reason is that 
unlike personal owners, institutional owners have lower potential and ability 
to consume control benefits. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the 
theory and existing empirical work as a background for our study. The 
details of our data are described in section 3. Section 4 describes the 
methodological choices we are making. Results are presented in section 5, 
and section 6 concludes. 
4.2 Existing literature  
This section considers potential explanations for the going public decision 
and points out why the Norwegian data allows us to investigate questions 
that have been hard to address using data from other countries. 
Going public is a major decision where the firm has to balance the 
cost of going public against the beneﬁts. There are huge costs in preparing 
for the IPO, both directly, for example through advisory fees, and indirectly, 
for instance through management time and attention. In the U.S., (Lee, 
Lochhead, Ritter, & Zhao, 1996) estimate the direct cost of an IPO at 11% of 
the issue proceeds, and as much as 19% if underpricing is taken into account. 
There are also recurring costs of being a public company. For 
instance, the firm faces higher costs caused by tighter regulations. In the 
sample analysed by (Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2010), foreign firms delist 
from the US equity markets as a reaction to decreased delisting costs caused 
by the Exchange Act Rule 12h-6. 
In the following section we summarize the existing empirical work 
and outline the theoretical background of the IPO decision. We group the 
discussion into five categories: Access to capital, information, liquidity, 
control benefits, and diversification. 
4.2.1 Access to capital 
The most immediate benefit of the IPO is normally a large capital injection. 
(Leone, Rock, & Willenborg, 2007) report that in their sample pre-IPO 
owners typically retain 65% of the shares in the company. The IPO might, 
however, not include a capital injection, as all shares sold to outside 
83 
 
investors might be shares sold by the current owners rather than newly 
issued shares. 
An IPO is a natural solution for many ﬁrms that need capital to 
ﬁnance future growth. Seminal work by (Modigliani & Miller, 1963) and 
(Scott, 1976) suggests there is an optimal capital structure for each firm. 
Highly levered ﬁrms, ﬁrms not paying dividends, ﬁrms with large capital 
expenditures, and ﬁrms that have grown recently are more likely to be below 
the optimal equity ratio.  
(Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998) investigate the financing 
question using data on Italian private ﬁrms for the sample period 1982–1992. 
They conclude that Italian companies go public to rebalance their balance 
sheet after a period of high investments and high growth. Thus the IPO is not 
to ﬁnance future growth. In fact investments in their sample declines after 
the IPO. Furthermore, they find that large firms and firms in industries with 
high market to book ratios are more likely than others to go public. 
In contrast, using an extensive sample of IPOs from 38 countries, 
(Kim & Weisbach, 2008) ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant amount of the cash raised in 
the IPO is used to ﬁnance future investments. They conclude that IPO 
proceeds are used over future time periods to fund a series of R&D and 
investment projects. 
(Boehmer & Ljungqvist, 2004) argues that because a firm’s 
probability of going public varies with time, one cannot use standard logit or 
probit techniques to analyze the chance of this event. They suggest using a 
so called hazard analysis, where they estimate a hazard function for the time-
varying probability of going public. Their sample includes 330 German 
firms that have indicated an intention to go public in the short or medium 
term. They find that companies going through with the transaction have 
more investment opportunities and higher valuations than other firms. 
However, although their sample is limited to firms that have stated that they 
intend to go public, it is unclear how strong this intention has to be in order 
to enter the sample. 
(Chemmanur, He, & Nandy, 2010) study the going public decision 
using a sample of U.S. manufacturing ﬁrms. They corroborate the ﬁnding 
that ﬁrms go public after a period of high growth. However, capital 
expenditures for manufacturing ﬁrms in their sample continue to grow after 
the IPO, at least for a few years. Since the stockmarket plays a relatively 
limited role in the Italian economy ((Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998) p. 
28), and since (Chemmanur, He, & Nandy, 2010) focus on manufacturing 
ﬁrms only, it is interesting to revisit the life cycle explanation for IPOs using 
a dataset that does not suffer from these limitations. Our dataset includes 
firms from all industries. In addition, the Norwegian market for external 
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capital is well developed and of a similar size, relative to the economy, as 
the U.S. market.3
4.2.2 Information 
 
(Leland & Pyle, 1977) and (Stewart C Myers & Majluf, 1984) suggest there 
is an informational asymmetry between the firm’s insiders and outsiders. 
Due to adverse selection and moral hazard, outside ﬁnance might therefore 
be more expensive. (Campbell, 1979) and (Yosha, 1995) suggests that public 
firms may have to disclose sensitive information that reduces their 
competitiveness relative to private firms. That is, a requirement to disclose 
more information hurts the competitive position of the public firm. As the 
firm grows larger or exists for a longer time, however, its competitive 
position gets more analyzed and the increased disclosure after an IPO is less 
costly. Also, firms in mature industries might have fewer opportunities to 
benefit from privacy. Hence, these ﬁrms are more likely to go public. 
When there is a separation between ownership and control, 
managers need to be monitored. (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1999) suggests 
that with dispersed ownership, the cost of monitoring might be duplicated. 
This means each owner must bear the same monitoring cost. Having one or a 
few large owners reduces this cost. This effect increases the cost of being a 
public company. An opposite eﬀect is suggested by (Subrahmanyam & 
Titman, 1999). A broad investor base will produce information 
serendipitously. Investors might read about the ﬁrm in a newspaper, on the 
Internet, or try some of its products (i.e., without explicitly looking for firm 
specific information). This information will then be conveyed to all investors 
through the stock price. Firms with extensive public contact might beneﬁt 
more from this type of information production. Therefore, they are more 
likely to go public. 
(Merton, 1987) presents a model where the value of a ﬁrm increases 
with the investor base, or what he calls degree of investor recognition. ’If 
you don’t know it you can’t by it’. Firms would therefore want to go public 
to increase their investor base. This is particularly true for private ﬁrms with 
concentrated ownership, which may benefit the most informationally. 
(Ritter & Welch, 2002) suggest insiders will take advantage of a 
market overvaluation. Thus, they will make the firm public when it faces 
favorable market conditions and insiders believe the firm is overvalued. 
Under these circumstances, outside investors might pay more than the true 
value of the firm. This is corroborated by (Kim & Weisbach, 2008), who 
finds that, at least for seasoned equity offerings, the firm’s owners try to time 
                                                     
3 At the end of 2009 the shares listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange were valued at 68% 
of the 2009 Norwegian GDP, compared to 103% for publicly traded shares in the 
U.S. Source: CIA Factbook 
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the market and sell more shares when the firm has a high market-to-book 
ratio. 
4.2.3 Liquidity 
(Zingales, 1995), (Mello & Parsons, 1998), (Bolton & von Thadden, 1998), 
and (Boot, Gopalan, & Thakor, 2006) suggest there is an important IPO gain 
from increased liquidity of the firm’s shares. By going public, the shares can 
be traded less costly, and the cost of capital will decrease. However, this 
may be less important in ﬁrms that are already dispersedly held and have low 
inside ownership. 
(Brau & Fawcett, 2006) interview 336 Chief Financial Oﬃcers 
(CFOs) in companies that either have gone public, or have the opportunity to 
do so, but have decided to stay private. They conclude that the main reason 
for going public is to facilitate acquisitions, while the main reasons to stay 
private is to retain control. Also, CFOs claim that they time the IPO 
according to overall market conditions, and that they are aware of the 
underpricing phenomenon. 
(Celikyurt, Sevilir, & Shivdasani, 2010) corroborates the idea of the 
IPO as prelude to M&A activity. They find, in their sample of 793 U.S. IPO 
firms, that acquisitions increase dramatically after the IPO. It is also 
significantly higher for IPO firms than for seasoned firms. 
4.2.4 Control benefits 
Large owners can extract control beneﬁts at the expense of smaller owners. 
This possibility is particularly acute when the minority is dispersed, and 
when the largest owner’s share is marginally above the threshold to exert 
control (normally 50%). Similarly, (Maug, 1996) suggests that managers 
with large ownership stakes can ensure that they keep their highly paid jobs 
(entrenchment). By staying private, the owner-manager keeps her decision 
autonomy, limits the agency costs between managers and owners, and 
continues to consume control benefits. 
(Helwege & Packer, 2009) investigate private firms that have to file 
with the SEC, typically because they have publicly traded debt or 
particularly dispersed ownership. They conclude that the reason for the high 
leverage in their sample of 181 U.S. firms is the managers’ determination to 
avoid outside equity. Firms that conduct a private placement of shares are 
more likely go public at a later stage. They suggest maintaining control is an 
important reason to stay private. However, their sample of firms that are 
required to report to the SEC may not be particularly representative for firms 
in general that may choose to go public. 
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4.2.5 Diversification 
Large owners may have a disproportionally large share of their wealth 
invested in their firm. Making an IPO is a way of diversifying their holding 
into other assets. 
(Bodnaruk, Kandel, Massa, & Simonov, 2008) use a sample of 124 
IPOs from Sweden and study how the degree of portfolio diversiﬁcation 
among the pre-IPO shareholders aﬀect the going public decision. Their main 
ﬁnding is that ﬁrms with less diversiﬁed shareholders are more likely to go 
public. 
(L. Pastor, Taylor, & Veronesi, 2009) study the diversiﬁcation 
beneﬁts of an IPO in a model with symmetric information and learning. 
Their model has implications for ﬁrm proﬁtability around the IPO that is 
supported in a study of more than 7,000 U.S. IPOs. They conclude that 
diversiﬁcation beneﬁts are important for the IPO decision. 
While consumption of control benefits may make controlling owners 
reluctant to make an IPO, the implication of the importance of 
diversification pulls in the other direction. Large owners wanting to diversify 
their portfolio may want to take the firm public to enjoy the benefits of 
diversification. 
Our data includes information on the 50 largest owners for all 
private ﬁrms in Norway. Compared to the study of (Bodnaruk, Kandel, 
Massa, & Simonov, 2008), who are limited to a matching sample of 277 
ﬁrms that did not go public, our data allows a unique opportunity to 
investigate the importance of the ownership structure for the decision to go 
public or remain private. 
One way to circumvent the problem of accessing comprehensive 
data on private companies is to study public firms, i.e., firms that have 
already gone through with the IPO. Firms that are public still have to balance 
the costs and benefits of staying public. Therefore, we can learn about this 
tradeoff by looking at public firms that decide to go private. (Bharath & 
Dittmar, 2010)  takes this approach and suggest looking at the going private 
decision of public companies. They analyze 1,023 companies in the U.S. that 
went private in the period 1980-2004. 
In the sample analysed by (Bharath & Dittmar, 2010), the typical 
firm that go private has less stock turnover, less analyst coverage, less 
institutional ownership, and more concentrated ownership. Firms going 
private also have more free cashflow and engage in fewer acquisitions. This 
supports theories suggesting that companies go public for informational 
reasons, for access to capital, for liquidity, and for corporate control reasons. 
They find these characteristics already at the IPO date, which on average is 
13 years prior to the going private date. 
All studies in the literature suffer from a possibly biased sample. 
This is because the researchers lack reliable information on private 
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companies. Researchers have so far had to rely on samples of firms where 
there is data, which are the firms that went public. These firms might not be 
representative for all firms that might go public. 
Table 1 summarizes theories and empirical findings in the existing 
literature. We build on this, and go on to isolate the effect of ownership 
structure on the likelihood of making an IPO. We hypothesize that large 
controlling owners prefer to keep their firms private to continue consuming 
control benefits. We expect a positive relationship between ownership 
concentration and the likelihood of the IPO. Similarly we expect firms with 
institutional owners to be more likely to go public. Table 2 shows the 
empirical proxies we will use for investigating the reasons to go public. 
4.3 Data and sample selection 
Our study use accounting information and ownership structure data from the 
Centre for Corporate Governance Research (www.bi.no/ccgr) for the 
population of limited liability ﬁrms in Norway. The CCGR gets data from 
Experian (www.experian.no), which collects their data from a governmental 
registry called Brønnøysundregistrene (www.brreg.no). Norwegian 
companies, private and public, are required by law to ﬁle audited annual 
statements according to the same format. 
Our sample period is 2000 – 2008. Observations are recorded at year 
end, resulting in a maximum time-series length of nine years per ﬁrm. There 
is a total of 319,038 unique ﬁrms in the data, of which the overwhelming 
majority are non-listed. However, due to the listing requirements of the Oslo 
Stock Exchange, most of these ﬁrms do not have the option to become listed. 
The two ways to list at the Oslo Stock Exchange are the Main list 
and the Axess list. The formal listing requirements for the Main list is a 
minimum of NOK 300 million in total assets, at least 500 shareholders, and 
at least 25 per cent of the shares widely held. A firm should have been in 
operation for at least three years. On the Oslo Axess list, the requirements 
are a minimum of NOK 8 million in total assets, at least 100 shareholders, 
and at least 25 per cent of the shares widely held. As Oslo Axess was 
established only in 2007, we will not consider which market place a firm 
lists on. 
To construct the sample of ﬁrms that could possibly list on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange (listing candidates), we replace the formal listing 
requirement by a requirement that a ﬁrm must have been in business for at 
least three years, and that there are accounting data for at least these three 
years. More precisely, a company-year is included in the sample of non-
listed companies if (1) the company is not already listed or was listed in the 
past, (2) the company has positive revenues for the current year and the last 
three years, and (3) the total assets for the current year exceeds NOK 4 
million. We do not take into account the current spread of ownership, as this 
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typically changes during the IPO process. We include firms which are 
smaller than the formal listing requirement threshold because firms can use 
the IPO process to increase their total assets. 
Table 3 provides descriptive information for the sample of 179,701 
company years. Comparing the descriptive statistics for the firms that are 
going public in Panel A with those for candidate firms that are staying 
private in Panel B, we see that the going public firms are on average much 
larger than the firms that choose not to go public. The median IPO firm has 
total assets of NOK 152 million, while the median of all firms in the sample 
is NOK 10 million. The difference in terms of sales is reversed. The median 
staying private firm turns over NOK17 million, while the median IPO firm 
turns over NOK6 million. This suggests IPO firms are much more capital 
intensive and sell much less than candidate firms that choose to stay private. 
 IPO firms have a lower debt to asset ratio than private firms. This 
suggest there are other reasons than concern for the capital structure to go 
public, as it seems IPO firms do not rely on debt to the same extent as firms 
that stay private. However, IPO firms are less profitable, with a median ROA 
of zero. Staying private firms have a median profitability of 9 per cent. 34 
per cent of staying private firms pay dividends in a given year, while 21 per 
cent of IPO firms do the same. Thus, by this metric, IPO firms seem more 
capital constrained than the staying private firms. 
The ownership variables show that the median Herfindahl index4
4.4 Methodology  
 of 
ownership concentration is 0.82 for private firms and 0.23 for IPO firms. 
The typical private (non-IPO) firm has a large owner with 90 per cent of the 
shares, while in the typical IPO firm the largest owner has 41 per cent of the 
shares. The CEO typically owns 50 per cent of the shares in the private firm 
sample, but only 14 per cent in the IPO firms. This suggests that large 
owners prefer to keep their firms private. When the ownership structure gets 
more diluted, the probability of doing an IPO increases. 
The deﬁning feature of the data is that a ﬁrm stays in one state (non-listed) 
for a number of periods, and then possibly exits the sample by going public 
(listed). Thus, the IPO decision lends itself naturally to being analyzed by a 
hazard model approach. This methodology is used in, for example, (Bharath 
& Dittmar, 2010) . In the language of hazard models, we will treat an IPO as 
a terminating event. In other words, a non-listed ﬁrm is kept in our sample 
until it does an IPO, at which point it exits the sample. If the ﬁrm exits for 
                                                     
4 The Herfindahl index of ownership is calculated by summing the squared fraction 
of shares held by each owner. A firm owned by a single owner will have a 
Herfindahl index of one, while a very dispersedly owned firm will have an index 
close to zero. 
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other reasons, or if the sample period ends, we treat it as a right-truncation of 
the data. Since our sample period starts in 2000, there are a number of ﬁrms 
that entered the sample with a long history of not going public. This issue 
will be referred to as left-truncation of the data. Note also that the variable of 
interest, the probability of IPO, might vary over time. Our estimation will 
investigate cross-sectional differences between firms as well as changes over 
time. 
Our implementation of a hazard model follows (Shumway, 2001). 
He shows that a standard logit model estimation where each ﬁrm-year is 
treated as a unique observation is equivalent to running a hazard model. We 
use the (Cox, 1972) proportional hazard model with the  (Breslow, 1974) 
approximation to resolve ties. The model to be estimated is 
 
h(t,X(t))= h(t,0)exp(β’X(t)),  
 
where h(t,X(t)) is the hazard rate at time t for a firm with covariates X(t). 
This model is flexible enough to handle both censoring and time variation. 
The Cox regression allows us to estimate the coefficient vector β without 
imposing any restrictions on the baseline hazard, h(t,0). A positive 
coefficient suggests that a higher value of the variable is linked to a higher 
hazard rate, implying that the firm is more likely to go public. 
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Base case 
Table 4 presents the base case results.5
Looking at the ownership variables, there is a significantly negative 
coefficient for the fractional holding of the largest owner. This suggest large 
owners prefer to keep their firms private, and does not support the idea that 
 The table shows that firms are more 
likely to go public when they are large, have low profitability, and do not 
pay dividends. This is in line with previous findings and our predictions in 
table 2. Large firms may have exhausted other sources of capital, and go 
public to tap the public markets. Second, paying dividends may be a sign 
that the firm is generating sufficient capital internally, and do not need to go 
public for accessing the public equity market. Finally, we get a negative 
coefficient for profitability, suggesting that firms with lower profitability go 
public. Firms with high profitability may have easier access to other sources 
of capital, either internally generated or by having sufficient debt capacity. 
These findings support the argument of the firm going public to more easily 
access capital. 
                                                     
5 There seems to be no serious multicolinearity, as the correlation coefficients are 
less than 0.2 for all base case variables. 
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large owners take the firm public for diversification reasons.6
Our results also indicate that younger firms are more likely to go 
public. This seems to go against the information story that adverse selection 
makes outside finance more expensive. Older, well known, firms might have 
easier access to private capital, both internally and externally. They can 
therefore avoid the IPO. This finding might also be due to the left censoring 
of the data. An older firm that has not gone public before we start observing, 
might have firm-specific characteristic that we do not observe. These 
characteristics may make it less likely to go public in our observation 
window. For instance, the firm may have an exceptional source of capital or 
a particularly entrenched manager caused by tenure and charisma. 
 The coefficient 
for the fraction of shares held by institutional owners is positive but not 
significant at a 10 percent level. The findings corroborate findings in earlier 
work and the idea that a going public decision trades off benefits of control 
with the benefits being a publicly traded company. 
4.5.2 Alternative empirical proxies 
In table 5 we measure the theoretical variables in alternative ways. We also 
add more variables to the model. In the first column we use the Herfindahl 
index of ownership as a measure of ownership dispersion instead of the 
holding of the largest owner. In the second column we control for the growth 
of total assets in. The main results do not change. However, the coefficient 
for the Growth variable is significantly positive. This corroborates findings 
from for example (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998) that firms that 
experience high growth subsequently go public. The coefficients for Size, 
Largest owner, and Age keep their significance. This corroborates our 
findings in the base case regression. 
In column three we use an alternative measures for Investments. 
Moreover, we measure ownership concentration by the fraction of shares 
owned by the five largest owners. The coefficient for Investments measured 
as capital expenditures over fixed assets is significantly positive. This further 
corroborates the previous result on growth. The coefficient for the alternative 
ownership concentration variable is similar to the base case coefficient, 
supporting our result on ownership concentration. 
We have run unreported regression of the base case model on the 
whole population of Norwegian limited liability firms, rather than just our 
IPO candidates. We get the same signs on the coefficients, but the inclusion 
of non-candidate firms adds considerable noise. Therefore, we lose 
significance on most variables except for size, which is still significant. This 
                                                     
6 Unfortunately, we do not have data on the owners’ total investment portfolios. 
Therefore we are unable to explore this question further as done in (Bodnaruk, 
Kandel, Massa, & Simonov, 2008). 
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is as expected when we include all firms, most of which are very small. This 
result also shows that to keep power in the test statistics, it is important to 
exclude firms that do not have the option to list. 
Summarizing, our findings are robust to alternative ways of 
measuring the theoretical variables. Moreover, to increase the power of the 
tests, it is important to include only candidate firms in the sample. 
4.5.3 Ownership 
It is ultimately the owners who decide to take a firm public or to keep it 
private. Ownership structure and control concerns are therefore likely to be 
important for the IPO decision. The findings reported in table 4 and 5 
support this idea, showing that the more concentrated the ownership, the less 
likely a firm is to be taken public. In the following, we investigate further 
how a controlling owner may influence the going public decision. More 
specifically, we look more closely at how the likelihood of going public 
depends on the holdings of the largest owner. 
In table 6 we construct a dummy variable that takes the value one if 
the largest owner holds more than 50 per cent of the shares in the firm and 
zero otherwise. We define this as being a controlling owner. A controlling 
owner might be in a position to enjoy control benefits from controlling the 
firm, and can also decide if the firm should go public. Since the IPO decision 
entails trading off control benefits for the value of being a public company, 
firms with a controlling owner should be less likely to go public. In column I 
we find that this dummy variable by itself does not have a coefficient 
significantly different from zero. 
In column II we interact this dummy variable with the absolute size 
of the controlling owner’s shareholding. None of these coefficients are 
significantly different from zero. 
These results suggest that, beyond the effect of ownership 
concentration in general, having a controlling owner does not alter the 
likelihood of making an IPO. This is consistent with the idea that there exists 
strong minority protection, and that crossing the threshold of control does 
not by itself increase the possibilities of consuming control benefits for the 
controlling owner. 
The management of the firm might also be in a position to enjoy 
control benefits. This problem might be particularly acute if the firm is 
dispersedly owned and lacks a controlling owner. High leverage may still 
discipline the firm’s management. That is, increased monitoring by creditors 
might lead to a decrease in the possibilities of consuming control benefits for 
management. In column III we investigate this by interacting the control 
dummy with the leverage variable. The Control variable itself is not 
significant. The coefficient for the Leverage variable is significantly 
negative, while the coefficient for the interaction term takes on almost the 
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exact same positive value. The negative coefficient for Leverage suggests 
that firms with high leverage are less likely to go public, while the positive 
coefficient for the interaction term suggests that this is only true for firms 
without a controlling owner. This result is consistent with the idea that high 
leverage is a substitute for owner monitoring. 
In column IV we include both interaction terms. The coefficients do 
not significantly change from what we found in column II and III. 
To further investigate how ownership influences the IPO decision, 
we split our dataset into three subsamples based on the holdings of the 
largest owner. Column I of table 7 gives the results for the firms were the 
largest owner has less then a 50 per cent holding. In column II the largest 
owner has from 50 to 75 per cent while in column III we include all firms 
where the largest owner holds more than 75 per cent of the shares. Our 
estimates suffer from the fact that each subsample includes few IPOs, being 
between 7 and 66 for each subsample. As a result, many coefficients lose 
their significance. 
Most coefficients keep the same sign as our previous tables. 
Interestingly, we find that for the group of firms in the 50 – 75 per cent 
region, the coefficient for the Largest owner becomes close to zero, while in 
the two other groups it is still significantly negative. One interpretation 
might be that in firms with a controlling owner, there is less scope for 
management to consume control benefits, as the controlling owner has the 
incentive and the power to monitor and discipline the management of the 
firm. Hence, as soon as you reach the threshold where there is a controlling 
owner, there is less reason to go public to limit the consumption of control 
benefits by management. However, when the minority ownership becomes 
very small (75 – 100 pre cent region), the controlling owner herself has more 
scope for consuming control benefits, and the likelihood of making an IPO 
decreases. 
Our findings suggest that majority owners may use their control 
rights to consume control benefits. When there is no controlling owner, the 
management of the firm has more scope to consume control benefits. 
However, this possibility seems to be limited when the firm is highly 
levered. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the determinants of a firm’s decision to go public and 
list its shares on an exchange. We use a very rich and accurate dataset for 
Norwegian private firms. We take advantage of the fact that, regardless of 
listing status, all firms have to publish audited financial statements each 
year. 
Our findings support previous studies on the costs and benefits of 
being a publicly traded firm. However, we augment earlier models by 
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ownership characteristics, and find support for the idea that the owners trade 
private benefits of control with the benefits of being a public firm. Our 
findings suggest that majority owners keep their firms private to enjoy 
control benefits. Managers in dispersedly owned firms may consume private 
benefits, while their opportunity to do so decreases if the firm is highly 
levered. We find that firms with institutional owners are more likely to make 
an IPO. Contrary to previous research, we do not find a tendency for large 
owners taking the firm public for diversification reasons. 
  
94 
 
Table 1: Theoretical predictions for reasons to go public  
 
Access to capital 
1. Cost of capital (Modigliani & Miller, 1963; Scott, 1976): Non-dividend 
paying ﬁrms. 
2. Overcoming ﬁnancial constraints (Stewart C Myers & Majluf, 1984): 
Highly levered ﬁrms, ﬁrms with large capital expenditure, and ﬁrms with 
high growth. 
Information  
3. Adverse selection (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Ritter & Welch, 2002): Large, 
older ﬁrms in mature industries. Firms in industries with a high market-
to-book ratio. 
4. Duplicate monitoring (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1999): Firms with high 
institutional ownership.  
5. Serendipitous information production (Subrahmanyam & Titman, 1999): 
Firms in industries with extensive public contact.  
6. Investor recognition (Merton, 1987): Firms with concentrated 
ownership.  
Liquidity 
7. Stock as currency (Brau & Fawcett, 2006): Firms that seek to be taken 
over. 
8. Beneﬁt of liquidity (Bolton & von Thadden, 1998; A. W. a Boot, 
Gopalan, & Anjan V. Thakor, 2006; Mello & Parsons, 1998; Zingales, 
1995): Firms seeking the liquidity provided by a listed stock. 
Control 
9. Beneﬁts of control (A. W. a Boot, Gopalan, & Anjan V. Thakor, 2006; 
Brau, Francis, & Kohers, 2003; Mello & Parsons, 1998; Zingales, 1995): 
More dispersedly held firms. Firms with lower inside ownership. Firms 
without a controlling owner. Firms with low leverage. 
Diversification 
10. Owner diversification (Bodnaruk, Kandel, Massa, & Simonov, 2008; L. 
Pastor, Taylor, & Veronesi, 2009): Firms with concentrated ownership. 
 
This table summarizes the hypotheses on the determinants of the IPO 
decision. Under each headline we highlight the characteristic which the 
theory suggests will make a firm more likely to go public. 
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Table 2: Empirical proxies 
 
Access to capital 
1. Profitability: EBITDA over total assets; EBITDA over total sales 
2. Dividend: Dummy equalling 1 if the firm pays dividends and zero 
otherwise 
3. Leverage: Debt-to-asset ratio; EBITDA over interest expense 
4. Investment: Captal expenditure over total asset; captial expenditure over 
fixed assets 
5. Growth: Percentage increas in total assets over the year 
Information 
6. Size: The log of total assets; the log of total sales (in million NOK) 
7. Age: The log of the age of the firm in years 
8. Institutional: The proportion of equity owned by institutional investors 
Control 
9. Dispersion: The total number of owners; the percentage ownership of the 
five largest owners 
10. Herfindahl: The Herfindahl index of ownership 
Diversification 
11. Largest owner: The percent equity holding of the largest owner 
 
This table describe the empirical proxies used in the analysis. Total assets 
and Total sales are adjusted for inflation. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics 
Panel A: Company years in which the company went public
Variable Observations mean std min median max
Total assets 120 6 983 57 363 0.09 152.34 610 228
Fixed assets 120 1 556 10 497 0.00 72.44 108 733
Long term debt 120 908 6 193 0.00 6.44 63 719
Sales 120 1 433 13 398 -0.03 6.22 146 060
EBITDA 120 327 3 252 -2189 -1.23 34 965
Debt over assets 120 0.20 0.28 0.00 0.06 1.57
Investment (total assets) 98 0.03 0.17 -0.46 0.00 0.91
Investment (fixed assets) 95 -0.18 2.30 -22.00 0.00 2.08
Owned by institutions 107 13.96 23.19 0.00 0.00 100
Herfindahl 107 0.43 0.39 0.02 0.23 1.00
Number of owners 107 1.03 7.98 0.00 0.00 79.83
Pct largest owner 107 51.94 34.53 6.70 41.07 100
Pct five largest owners 107 75.84 23.39 26.17 79.39 100
Age 109 10.83 19.74 0.00 5.00 149.00
Asset growth 98 240.89 1376 -0.50 0.21 10 153
Number of employees 82 255.52 1411 0.00 2.50 10 293
EBITDA over total assets 120 -0.10 0.40 -3.35 0.00 0.42
EBIDTA over sales 90 -13.55 61.52 -517.54 -0.08 1.28
Dividends 120 0.13 0.34 0 0 1  
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B. Company years in which the company did not go public
Variable Observations mean std min median max
Total assets 179 581 72.02 948 4.00 9.99 112 532
Fixed assets 179 581 42.54 778 -3.39 2.90 100 712
Long term debt 179 581 22.17 427 -10.4 1.65 59 078
Sales 179 581 78.06 728 -13.1 17.30 84 017
EBITDA 179 581 9.31 305 -1 828 0.97 43 562
Debt over assets 179 581 0.24 0.31 -2.23 0.15 31.93
Investment (total assets) 179 581 -0.04 3.03 -990.57 -0.02 1.00
Investment (fixed assets) 177 038 -2.34 726.74 -305 590 -0.10 9.56
Owned by institutions 173 236 7.48 24.20 0.00 0.00 100
Herfindahl 173 122 0.70 0.31 0.00 0.82 1
Number of owners 173 242 1.63 11.88 0.00 0.00 100
Pct largest owner 173 205 74.61 28.12 0.00 90 100
Pct five largest owners 173 205 97.26 9.98 0.00 100 100
Age 173 647 16.37 14.67 0.00 13 200
Asset growth 179 581 0.21 10.36 -1.00 0.04 3 855
Number of employees 81 637 31.13 219.44 0.00 10 21 850
EBITDA over total assets 179 581 0.11 0.20 -10.40 0.09 20
EBIDTA over sales 179 581 -0.21 17.07 -3 424 0.06 2 176
Dividends 179 581 0.35 0.48 0 0 1
Panel A of this table gives summary statistics for the firms that make an IPO in the next period (the
IPO sample). Panel B gives summary statistics of firms that stay private the next period. Relevant
figures are adjusted for inflation. The sample is all non-listed Norwegian limited liability firms in the
period 2000 - 2008 with total assets larger than NOK 4 million and a three year history of positive sales.
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Table 4: Logistic regression
Coefficient Std Z-value Prob
Size 0.846 0.047 18.14 0.00
Leverage -0.894 0.454 -1.97 0.05
Investment 0.944 0.594 1.59 0.11
Profitability -0.003 0.001 -3.55 0.00
Largest owner -0.042 0.004 -10.82 0.00
Age -0.060 0.014 -4.3 0.00
Dividends -1.221 0.301 -4.06 0.00
Institutional 0.008 0.004 1.81 0.07
Observations 167369
Pseudo R2 0.224
Chi2 386.77
This table shows the base case regression. The coefficients are estimated
using a Cox proportional hazard model where the dependent variable is the
probability of an IPO. Size is the log of total assets, Leverage is debt over
total assets, Investments is capital expenditure over total assets, Profitability
is EBIDTA over sales, Largest owner is the proportion of shares held by
the largest owner, Age is the log of the number of years since the firm was
incorporated, Dividends is a dummy variable equalling 1 if dividends were
paid and 0 otherwise, while Institutional is the proportion of shares held by
institutional investors. The sample is all non-listed Norwegian limited liability
firms in the period 2000 - 2008 with total assets larger than NOK 4 million
and a three year history of positive sales.
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Table 5: Robustness tests 
I II III IV
Size 0.898*** 0.851*** 0.709*** 0.870***
(18.94) (17.92) (16.51) (18.57)
Leverage -0.579 -0.820 -0.467 -0.672
(-1.29) (-1.78) (-1.06) (-1.50)
Investment (total assets) 0.000973 0.00131
(0.07) (0.09)
Investment (fixed assets) 0.429 1.725**
(0.69) (2.69)
Profitability (sales) -0.00334*** -0.00311*** -0.00321***
(-3.90) (-3.71) (-3.99)
Profitability (assets) -0.841***
(-3.56)
Dividends -1.179*** -1.180*** -0.834** -1.189***
(-3.93) (-3.92) (-2.79) (-3.95)
Institutional 0.00971* 0.00964* 0.0132*** 0.00880*
(2.29) (2.29) (3.43) (2.10)
Largest owner -0.0448***
(-11.38)
Five largest owners -0.0492***
(-14.61)
Herfindahl -4.620*** -4.187***
(-11.62) (-10.97)
Age -0.0588*** -0.0633*** -0.0560*** -0.0574***
(-4.36) (-4.44) (-4.03) (-4.24)
Growth 0.00294**
(3.14)
Observations 165027 167290 167369 165104
Pseudo R2 0.252 0.241 0.230 0.237
Chi2 418.6 416.3 396.8 393.8
This table shows the regressions with alternative and new proxies. The coefficients
are estimated using Cox proportional hazard model where the dependent variable is the
probability of an IPO. Size is the log of total sales or log of total assets, Leverage is
debt over total assets, Investments is capital expenditure over total assets or capital
exenditure over fixed assets, Profitability is EBIDTA over sales, Largest owner is the
proportion of shares held by the largest owner, Five largest owners is the proportion of
shares held by the five largest owners, Age is the log of the number of years since the
firm was incorporated, while Dividends is a dummy variable equalling 1 if dividends
were paid and 0 otherwise. The t-values are shown in paranthesis, and statistically
significant relationships at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as *, **, and ***
respectively. The sample is all non-listed Norwegian limited liability firms in the period
2000 - 2008 with total assets larger than NOK 4 million and a three year history of
positive sales.  
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Table 6: Controlling owners 
I II III IV
Size 0.846*** 0.820*** 0.859*** 0.835***
(18.19) (16.97) (18.37) (17.20)
Leverage -0.886 -0.788 -2.311*** -2.258***
(-1.95) (-1.73) (-4.12) (-3.90)
Investment 0.913 0.832 1.122 1.063
(1.53) (1.37) (1.91) (1.80)
Profitability -0.00295*** -0.00296*** -0.00289*** -0.00295***
(-3.68) (-3.88) (-3.33) (-3.61)
Dividends -1.222*** -1.173*** -1.257*** -1.217***
(-4.07) (-3.89) (-4.19) (-4.05)
Largest owner -0.0476*** -0.0616*** -0.0459*** -0.0598***
(-6.83) (-5.82) (-6.63) (-5.67)
Age -0.0592*** -0.0577*** -0.0586*** -0.0571***
(-4.28) (-4.20) (-4.22) (-4.13)
Institutional 0.00774 0.00832* 0.00903* 0.00947*
(1.85) (1.98) (2.20) (2.30)
Control 0.460 -0.995 -0.354 -1.769
(1.05) (-1.03) (-0.74) (-1.83)
Control * Leverage 3.031*** 3.000***
(4.47) (4.43)
Control * Largest owner 0.0270 0.0266
(1.79) (1.78)
Observations 167369 167369 167369 167369
Pseudo R2 0.225 0.227 0.233 0.235
Chi2 387.8 391.2 401.8 405.1
This table shows coefficients estimated using Cox proportional hazard model
where the dependent variable is the probability of an IPO. Size is the log of total
sales or log of total assets, Leverage is debt over total assets, Investments is
capital expenditure over total assets or capital exenditure over fixed assets,
Profitability is EBIDTA over sales, Largest owner is the proportion of shares
held by the largest owner, Herfindahl is the Herfindahl indeks of share
ownership, Age is the log of the number of years since the firm was
incorporated, Dividends is a dummy variable equalling 1 if dividends were paid
and 0 otherwise, Control is a dummy variable equalling 1 if the larges
shareholder holds more than 50 percent of the shares and 0 otherwise. The t-
values are shown in paranthesis, and statistically significant relationships at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as *, **, and *** respectively. The sample is
all non-listed Norwegian limited liability firms in the period 2000 - 2008 with total
assets larger than NOK 4 million and a three year history of positive sales.
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Table 7: Splitting ownership concentration 
0 - 50 50 - 75 75 - 100
Size 1.053*** 1.307*** 0.619***
(14.95) (6.23) (8.49)
Leverage -2.406*** -0.740 0.569
(-3.79) (-0.47) (1.03)
Investment 1.235 3.155 1.941
(1.66) (1.45) (1.64)
Profitability -0.00504*** -0.000954 -0.00243
(-3.57) (-0.33) (-1.49)
Dividends -1.471*** -0.471 -1.579*
(-3.72) (-0.55) (-2.19)
Largest owner -0.0401** -0.0228 -0.0817***
(-3.20) (-0.46) (-3.45)
Age -0.0984*** -0.0576 -0.0436
(-4.25) (-1.30) (-1.95)
Institutional 0.0150* 0.0320* 0.00940
(2.53) (2.45) (1.51)
Observations 34234 40522 92613
Pseudo R2 0.298 0.348 0.157
Chi2 265.3 41.68 77.51
In each column in this table, only firms with a largest owner with a
ownership share falling in the specified region is included. The
coefficients are estimated using Cox proportional hazard model
where the dependent variable is the probability of an IPO. Size is
the log of total sales or log of total assets, Leverage is debt over
total assets, Investments is capital expenditure over total assets or
capital exenditure over fixed assets, Profitability is EBIDTA over
sales, Largest owner is the proportion of shares held by the largest
owner, Five largest owners is the proportion of shares held by the
five largest owners, Age is the log of the number of years since
the firm was incorporated, while Dividends is a dummy variable
equalling 1 if dividends were paid and 0 otherwise. The t-values
are shown in paranthesis, and statistically significant relationships
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level are labelled as *, **, and ***
respectively. The sample is all non-listed Norwegian limited liability
firms in the period 2000 - 2008 with total assets larger than NOK 4 
million and a three year history of positive sales.
Largest owner
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